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 ABSTRACT 
 
Mac Giolla, E. (2016). Towards a theory of true and false intentions. Department of 
Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Sweden. 
 
An ability to discriminate between statements of true and false intent is critical for many 
legal professionals. However, it is only in recent years that psycho-legal researchers have 
turned to this topic. The current thesis proposes a theoretical framework aimed to 
parsimoniously account for past research and to generate novel hypotheses in this 
burgeoning field of enquiry. In brief, it is proposed that the predictable consequences of 
active goals will be more pronounced for those with a true compared to a false intention. 
This is because the predictable consequences of goals aid in goal attainment and this 
function is lost on the empty goals of a false intention. Hypotheses derived from the 
theoretical framework were tested in three studies. Study I examined whether indicators 
of good planning behavior could provide novel cues to discriminate between true and 
false statements of intent. Truth tellers planned a neutral task, while liars planned a mock-
crime. In interviews truth tellers honestly described their intentions, while liars provided a 
cover-story thematically similar to the truth tellers’ task. The interviews were coded for 
markers of good planning behavior (e.g., effective time allocation). As predicted truth 
tellers’ statements were colored to a higher degree than liars’ by such markers. Study II 
examined the benefit of asking unanticipated questions when interviewing groups of 
suspects on repeated occasions. The experimental design was the same as that used in 
Study I. Participants were asked anticipated questions on their intentions, and 
unanticipated questions on the planning of their intentions. Truth tellers provided longer 
and more detailed answers than liars, and had higher levels of within-group consistency 
compared to liars. This was the case for answers to both anticipated and unanticipated 
questions. No differences between truth tellers and liars were found for between-statement 
consistency. The results highlight within-group consistency as an important cue to deceit. 
However, a number of limitations to the unanticipated questions approach were evident. 
Study III examined the prevalence and manifestation of spontaneous thoughts in relation 
to true and false intentions. Based on the finding that future tasks generate spontaneous 
thoughts, it was predicted that those with a true intention would experience task-related 
spontaneous thoughts to a greater extent than those with a false intention. As predicted, 
truth tellers reported experiencing task-related spontaneous thoughts to a greater extent 
than liars. However, these subjective differences did not manifest as discernable cues in 
interviews. By and large, the proposed theoretical framework received support from the 
empirical studies. With a specific focus on intentions and goals, the proposed framework 
makes a unique contribution to deception theory.   
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 SWEDISH SUMMARY 
 
Människor kommunicerar ofta till varandra vad de avser att göra i framtiden. Ofta 
motsvarar dessa uttalanden en genuin avsikt att utföra den påstådda handlingen. Ibland 
syftar de dock till att vilseleda andra, t.ex. för att vinna andras förtroende och dölja andra 
avsikter. Rättspsykologisk forskning om intentioner bedrivs med målsättningen att bistå 
utredare med handfasta verktyg för att bättre särskilja sanna från falska utsagor om 
framtida beteenden. Den samhälleliga nyttan av sådan forskning är potentiellt mycket stor 
då en mängd olika situationer kräver bedömningar av sanningshalten i andras utryckta 
intentioner. Det kanske mest utmärkande exemplet är när polis eller säkerhetspersonal 
frågar en misstänkt om dennes planerade handlingar (t.ex. i gränskontroller, 
terroristutredningar). Även aktörer inom andra yrken och situationer behöver dagligen 
göra den här typen av bedömningar. Detta inkluderar domare som tar beslut om 
villkorliga frigivningar, försäkringsförsäljare, och läkare som skriver ut recept (där en 
växande trend är vidareförsäljning av receptbelagda läkemedel). 
Trots den tydliga samhällsnyttan har systematisk forskning på sanna och falska 
intentioner utförts i endast runt fem år. Ändå har över 20 artiklar och 5 avhandlingar redan 
hunnit publiceras på området. Den publicerade forskningen är märkbart spretig. 
Psykologi-forskare har närmat sig ämnet från ett flertal olika ingångar. Således bidrar 
denna avhandling till området genom att utveckla ett teoretiskt ramverk för att förena den 
tidigare forskningen.  
Målet var att skapa en allmän approach som utgår från lögnens psykologi och 
specifikt riktas mot intentioner. Ramverket utgår ifrån teorin att en (sann) intention skapar 
ett aktivt mål och därmed ett målinriktat beteende. Psykologisk grundforskning visar att 
aktiva mål följs av förutsägbara konsekvenser vilka i sin tur påverkar en individs 
beteende. Dessa konsekvenser kan vara både avsiktliga (t.ex. aktiva mål stimulerar 
planering) och mer automatiska (t.ex. aktiva mål påverkar hur vi värderar objekt i vår 
miljö). Poängen är att dessa konsekvenser är funktionella. De hjälper individen att utföra 
sin intention för att nå sitt mål. De som däremot utrycker en falsk intention skapar inte ett 
aktivt mål, åtminstone inte om det beteende som de bara påstår att de ska utföra. Den 
funktionella aspekten av de ovan nämnda konsekvenserna aktiveras därmed inte hos 
människor som utrycker en falsk intention. Därför förväntas de typiska konsekvenserna av 
intentioner vara svagare hos de som ljuger om sin intention.  
Utifrån avhandlingens teoretiska ramverk testades i tre studier två konsekvenser 
av intentionsskapande. De två första studierna fokuserade på planeringsfasen som föregår 
de flesta intentioner och den sista studien fokuserade på spontana tankar kring intentionen 
i motsats till mer resonerande tankar. Både planering och spontana tankar kan ses som 
konsekvenser av ett intentionsskapande som hjälper en människa att nå sina mål. 
 Studie I utfördes med syftet att identifiera nya ledtrådar för att särskilja mellan 
sanna och falska intentioner med fokus på planeringsfasen som föregår intentioner. 
Grundidén var att sanningssägare bör vara mer motiverade att planera sina sanna 
intentioner än vad lögnare är att planera sina falska intentioner (d.v.s. det de ämnar göra 
enligt sin cover story). Därför borde sanningssägarnas planering vara mer fullständig än 
lögnarnas, vilket skulle kunna resultera i skillnader i deras svar på frågor om deras 
planering under en intervju. Deltagarna (N = 132) delades upp i en sann intentionsgrupp 
 (sanningssägare) och en falsk intentionsgrupp (lögnare). Sanningssägare och lögnare 
genomförde sedan studien i grupper om tre. Under samarbetet i grupperna planerade 
sanningssägarna en icke-kriminell handling (att ordna en typisk svensk lunch för två 
utbytesstudenter) medan lögnarna fick uppdraget att utföra ett iscensatt brott (att leverera 
och hämta olika föremål med fiktiv kriminell koppling). Lögnarna blev även informerade 
om att det fanns en risk att bli stoppade av säkerhetspersonal, och att om detta skulle ske 
behövde de ha en förberedd cover story. Cover storyn speglade strukturmässigt den 
uppgift som den sanna intentionsgruppen fick (att ordna en svensk lunch för två 
utbytestudenter). Med andra ord, den planerade lunchen var den falska intentionen för 
lögnarna och den sanna intentionen för sanningsägarna. Deltagarna fick planera sitt 
uppdrag i 20 minuter. Direkt efter planeringsfasen, men precis innan uppdraget skulle 
genomföras, blev deltagarna stoppade och intervjuades istället om deras intentioner. 
Sanningssägarnas och lögnarnas transkriberade intervjuer kodades för markörer av ett 
välplanerat beteende (t.ex. effektiv tidsallokering, sannolikheten att tala om potentiella 
problem, osv.). I linje med den uppställda hypotesen präglades sanningssägarnas 
uttalanden i högre grad än lögnarnas av markörer som indikerade ett välplanerat beteende. 
Studie II fokuserade på huruvida oförutsedda frågor om planering – frågor som 
varken lögnare eller sanningssägare hade räknat med – kan användas i syfte att förbättra 
exempelvis polisers förmåga att särskilja mellan sanna och falska intentioner vid förhör. 
Den bakomliggande teorin är att graden av planering som ligger bakom en lögnares cover 
story är relativt begränsad. Därför ökar chansen för att lögnare upplevs som mindre 
trovärdiga när de får oförutsedda frågor om sin planering. Däremot, om en oförutsedd 
fråga ställs till en sanningsägare behöver personen endast förlita sig på sitt verkliga minne 
av planeringen, vilket bör resultera i att trovärdigheten står oförändrad. I studien 
intervjuades grupper av misstänkta vid upprepade tillfällen och under intervjuerna fick 
deltagarna förväntade frågor om deras intentioner och oförutsedda frågor om planeringen 
av deras intentioner. Fokus låg på att granska överensstämmelsen mellan individuella 
utsagor (i) inom gruppen och (ii) över tid. Studien bestod av två experiment. Deltagarna 
intervjuades en gång i Experiment 1 (N = 132) och tre gånger i Experiment 2 (N = 123). 
Underlaget för Experiment 1 utgjordes av data insamlade i samband med Studie I. 
Skillnaden var att sanningssägarnas och lögnarnas transkriberade intervjuer fokuserade på 
överensstämmelse mellan individuella utsagor istället för markörer av välplanerat 
beteende. Experiment 2 använde samma design som Experiment 1 förutom att varje 
deltagare intervjuades tre gånger. Resultaten visade att sanningssägarna gav längre, mer 
detaljerade och mer samstämmiga (inom gruppen) svar än lögnare på både de förväntade 
och de oförutsedda frågorna. Däremot visade det sig inte vara några skillnader mellan 
sanningssägarna och lögnarna vad gällde överenstämmelse mellan individuella utsagor 
över tid. 
Utgångspunkt för Studie III var grundforskning som visar hur framtida uppgifter 
oftast leder till spontana tankar om ärendet. Eftersom personer med en falsk intention inte 
har ett genuint ärende, predicerade vi att dessa skulle ha färre spontana tankar om deras 
utryckta intention jämfört med personer som har en sann intention. Studien bestod av tre 
experiment. Experiment 1 (N = 61) bekräftade grundidén genom att visa att människor 
som skapar en sann intention rapporterade att de upplevde fler spontana tankar kring det 
framtida ärendet jämfört med människor som bara påstod att de ska utföra ärendet (de 
 med en falsk intention). Experiment 2 (N = 55) utvecklade idén genom att undersöka om 
de självrapporterade skillnaderna i spontana tankar resulterade i mätbara skillnader vid en 
intervjusituation. Resultaten replikerade fynden från Experiment 1 med avseende till de 
självrapporterade måtten av spontana tankar. Däremot framkom inga skillnader mellan 
sanna och falska intentioner under intervjun. Experiment 3 (N = 100) undersökte 
grundidén i en mer verklighetsförankrad situation. Halva gruppen i studien skulle i 
verkligheten åka på den utlandsresa de beskrev – resan var därmed deras sanna 
intention. Den andra halvan påstod falskeligen att de skulle iväg på en resa – resan var 
därmed deras falska intention. Deltagarna tillfrågades i en följande intervju om deras 
spontana tankar kring resan. Hypotesen var att frågorna om spontana tankar kring resan 
skulle vara mer svårbesvarade för lögnarna eftersom de troligtvis hade upplevt färre 
spontana tankar kring resan jämfört med sanningssägare (de som faktiskt skulle resa). 
Inga tydliga skillnader i någon av våra jämförelser hittades mellan lögnarnas och 
sanningssägarnas beskrivningar. 
Sammantaget gav de tre studierna stöd för det teoretiska ramverk som 
avhandlingen avsåg att utveckla. Sanningssägare skapade bättre och mer detaljerade 
planer för att utföra sin utryckta intention jämfört med lögnare. Sanningssägare upplevde 
också fler spontana tankar relaterat till deras utryckta intention. Både planering och 
spontana tankar kan ses som funktionella konsekvenser av ett intentionsskapande. Enligt 
det förslagna ramverket var dessa konsekvenser svagare hos lögnare på grund av att de 
inte uppfyllde sitt funktionella syfte. Däremot resulterade dessa skillnader inte alltid i 
tydliga skillnader i en intervjusituation. Detta innebär att ytterligare forskning är 
nödvändig för att säkerställa konkreta råd för direkt tillämpning. Avhandlingens specifika 
fokus på teoretisk utveckling, vilket skiljer den från tidigare arbeten i fältet, ger dock ett 
unikt bidrag till den psykologiska lögnteorin. 
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BACKGROUND 
Since 9/11 a renewed and fervent interest on crime prevention has emerged. A 
salient example comes from the ever increasing measures being taken at airport security 
checks (e.g, the introduction of full body scanners at a number of international airports; 
Milmo, 2010). Fundamental to crime prevention is an ability to ascertain the veracity of 
statements of intent. The psycho-legal study of true and false intentions aims to address 
this issue. It is however, only in recent years that researchers have turned to this topic—
the majority of past research on deception detection has focused on true and false 
statements about past events (Vrij, 2008). In contrast, research on true and false intentions 
focuses on statements concerning future events. A statement of true intent refers to a 
future action which a speaker intends to carry out, while a statement of false intent refers 
to a future action which a speaker claims, but does not intend, to carry out. 
The issue of true and false intent has received some attention in related fields, 
including economic theory (Crawford, 2003; Hendricks & McAfee, 2006), military 
studies (Daniel & Herbig, 1982), and even ethology (Bond & Robinson, 1988; Laidre, 
2009; Moynihan, 1982). However, until recently no study had examined true and false 
intent from a legal psychological perspective (Granhag, 2010). A possible reason may be 
the philosophical problems that mar the topic when related to the legal context. Such 
issues are perhaps best typified by the musings of science fiction writers (e.g., Dick, 
1956/2002; Orwell, 1949/1989) emphasizing the difficulties associated with penalizing a 
thought that is, as of yet, unaccompanied by an action.  
Why then should legal-psychologists delve into this thorny issue? From a 
practical perspective, the most compelling answer is that many professionals need to 
make veracity judgments about others’ intent irrespective of whether research is 
conducted or not. This includes customs officers, judges at parole hearings, security 
personnel, migration officers and intelligence officers. There are also occupations outside 
of law-enforcement situations that regularly require the assessment of people’s intentions, 
such as insurance salesmen or even doctors prescribing medication. Without empirical 
research veracity judgements of statements of intent will at best be based on past 
experience and at worst on biased speculation. As an example, consider the airport 
security program Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) initiated in 
2007 by the American Transport Security Administration (TSA). The program maintained 
that malicious intent could be detected simply by observing passengers behavior. Despite 
criticism from prominent researchers highlighting a lack of empirical support 
(Weinberger, 2010), an external evaluation was not published until November 2013 (US 
Government Accountability Office, 2013). In brief, the evaluation concluded that the 
project, which had cost in excess of $900 million, was ineffective in its aims and future 
funding should be prohibited.  
From a theoretical perspective, it seems that methods applied to distinguish truths 
from lies about past actions need not apply to situations about future actions (Fenn, 
McGuire, Langben, & Blandón-Gitlin, 2015; Warmelink et al., 2011). Hence, these 
methods should also be examined with situations of intent. Research on true and false 
intentions can also provide unique opportunities in deception detection, not possible when 
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examining true and false statements about past events (Granhag & Mac Giolla, 2014). The 
current thesis focuses on these unique opportunities. Specifically, the goal of the current 
thesis is to put forth a theoretical framework which aims to: (1) account for the previously 
studied intention-specific approaches to deception; (2) generate new hypotheses to be 
tested in three separate studies, to be specified later; and, (3) generate new directions for 
future research.  
The thesis begins by providing a brief overview of the most prominent deception 
theories. These theories are then examined in light of empirical research. Following this, 
recent developments in strategic interviewing methods to detect deception are highlighted. 
In the next section, a theoretical framework for true and false intentions is proposed. This 
section includes definitional issues of intent, a review of the extant research of true and 
false intentions, and the outlines of a theoretical framework. Hypotheses are generated 
from this framework, which are tested in three separate studies. The remainder of the 
thesis reports and discusses these studies in light of the proposed theoretical framework.  
 
Overview of Deception Theories 
Vrij (2008, p. 15) defines a lie as “a successful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, 
without forewarning, to create in another a belief which the communicator considers to be 
untrue”. This definition means that lies can come in many different forms. They can be 
verbal or non-verbal (Bond & Robinson, 1988) and can range from outright fabrications 
to simply withholding the truth (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). 
Lies can also occur in different situations—ranging in severity from low- to high-stakes 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1969)—and can be told for a multitude of reasons—from criminal and 
malicious lies to good intentioned white ones (Lindskold & Walters, 1983). Given the 
multifaceted nature of lying, it is not surprising that psychological research on deception 
abounds with different theoretical approaches. Theories of deception have come from 
emotional perspectives (Ekman, 1985) and cognitive perspectives (Vrij, 2015a), and have 
drawn on such disparate areas of research as self-presentation (DePaulo et al., 2003), self-
regulation (Granhag & Hartwig, 2008) and persuasion (Stiff, 1995).  
 
Arousal, Emotions, and Non-Verbal Cues 
From antiquity to modern times, arousal or emotional perspectives have 
dominated theories of deception (Kleinmuntz & Szucko, 1984; Trovillo, 1939). In its 
simplest form this position holds that lying is more arousing than truth telling. Hence, by 
measuring arousal one can infer whether someone is lying (Vrij, 2008). This reasoning is 
the corner stone of the modern polygraph, whose exponents propagate that by measuring 
arousal through skin-conductors and heart monitors deception can be uncovered (Lykken, 
1998). The central idea of the polygraph differs little from lie detection methods used in 
ancient Greece or the Middle Ages, where it was also thought that increased arousal was 
indicative of deceit (Trovillo, 1939).  
An alternative approach is to examine how emotions manifest as non-verbal 
behavior. This position rests on the assumption that non-verbal behaviors are indicators of 
our internal states. Therefore, if non-verbal behaviors deviate from what one would expect 
 3 
 
based on the verbal behavior, this is suggestive of deceit (Vrij, 2008). The most influential 
exponents of this position are Paul Ekman and his colleagues (Ekman, Freisen, & Ancoli, 
1980; Ekman & Friesen, 1969). Ekman (1985) outlines three specific emotions that are 
expected to accompany lying: guilt of engaging in a morally dubious act; anxiety for fear 
of getting caught; and, in some situations, delight in successfully deceiving another—
duper’s delight. Of course, just as liars alter their statements, it can be assumed that liars 
will also alter their non-verbal behavior in order to mask their genuine emotion. However, 
it is argued that liars’ impression management will be limited. It is simply too much to 
control for all behaviors. As such, behaviors incongruent with liars’ claimed emotions will 
leak out, leaving behavioral traces suggestive of their genuine emotion (Ekman, 1985). 
For example, a liar trying to mask her anxiety with a pleasant smile, may display signs of 
nervousness through other behaviors such as picking at her fingernails (Ekman & Friesen, 
1969). 
The strength and reliability of these cues are thought to vary depending on the 
body part producing the behavior (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). Inspired by Darwin 
(1852/2002), it is argued that some non-verbal behaviors are so habitually linked to 
internal states that they are difficult to feign and almost impossible to fully suppress. It 
follows that reliable cues to deceit stem from the body parts and behaviors that are most 
difficult to control (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). Ekman (1985) posits that verbal 
communication, as the most controllable, will be the least reliable source of cues to deceit. 
Body movements (specifically of the legs and feet), vocal aspects (e.g., pitch), and micro-
expressions of the face, are claimed to be the most difficult to control and hence the most 
reliable sources of cues to deceit.  
Other researchers have added to this general position by examining the influence 
of context. For instance, based on research on interpersonal communication, Interpersonal 
Deception Theory (IDT) seeks to examine when in a communicative interaction cues to 
deceit can be expected to be greater or weaker (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). For example, if 
the suspicion of receivers (those who judge the veracity of a statement) increases, IDT 
predicts the non-strategic (leaked) behaviors of senders (truth tellers or liars) will increase 
in turn. For honest senders, the leaked behaviors may manifest as cues of frustration for 
failing to be believed. For deceptive senders the leaked behaviors may manifest as greater 
anxiety, for fear of being detected (Buller & Burgoon, 1996). 
 
Cognitive Dimensions of Deceit 
If an emotional approach can be seen as the first major pillar of deception 
theories, a cognitive approach can be seen as the second. A number of different 
approaches can be grouped into this second block, with the specific cues to deceit varying, 
depending on the approach. One position, with a long history in deception detection holds 
that lying is more cognitively demanding than truth telling (Zuckerman, DePaulo, & 
Rosenthal, 1981). It is argued that the task of recollection during truth telling is less taxing 
and more automatic than the task of lying, which consists in fabricating a logically 
consistent statement that does not contradict the receiver’s knowledge. Hence, signs of 
cognitive effort (e.g., pupil dilation, response latencies, etc.) can be understood as 
indicators of deceit (Zuckerman et al., 1981). Subsequent cognitive models of deception 
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can be seen as updates or refinements of the general cognitive model described by 
Zuckerman et al.1 These include Walczyk and colleagues’ Activation-Decision-
Construction Model (Walczyk, Roper, Seemann, & Humphrey, 2003; Walczyk et al., 
2005) and Sporer and Schwandt’s (2006, 2007) working memory model. 
Content analytic approaches (for an overview see Vrij, 2015b) and linguistic 
approaches (for an overview see Hauch, Blandón-Gitlin, Masip, & Sporer, 2014), can also 
be included under the cognitive approach to deception (though it should be noted that 
emotional perspectives have also been used to predict linguistic cues to deceit; e.g., 
Newman, Pennebaker, Berry, & Richards, 2003). The basic tenet of these approaches is 
that the different cognitive processes involved during lying or truth telling (e.g., semantic 
vs. episodic memory) will result in subtle differences in true and false statements. In other 
words, liars will have difficulty verbally approximating how a truth teller would answer. 
For example, the Reality Monitoring (RM) approach to deception detection (Alonso-
Quecuty, 1992; for overviews see Masip, Sporer, Garrido, & Herrero, 2005; Sporer, 2004) 
is based on basic memory research focusing on how people distinguish between the 
sources of their memories (Johnson & Raye, 1981). Memories of experienced events are 
attributed to external sources, where perception is the primary process involved. 
Memories of imagined events are attributed to internal sources, where less automatic 
conscious processes are necessary to fabricate the imagined event. Due to these different 
processes, statements concerning memories of experienced events are predicted to be 
qualitatively different from statements concerning memories of imagined events. For 
instance, memories of experienced events should contain more sensory information 
associated with perception, while memories of imagined events should contain more 
traces of cognitive operations necessary for fabrication, such as logical inferences (e.g., if 
it was raining outside, then I must have been wearing a jacket). In so far as truth tellers 
report experienced events and liars report imagined events, the differences predicted by 
RM should manifest as verbal cues indicative of honesty or deceit (Vrij, 2015b; for a 
similar approach see Criteria Based Content Analysis; Steller & Köhnken, 1989). 
 
General Theories of Deception  
The issue of context looms over both emotion-based and cognitive-based 
approaches to deception. The emotional perspective is reliant on high-stake situations, 
few differences between truth tellers and liars are expected for low-stakes everyday lies 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1969). Cognitive approaches face different concerns. For instance, 
positions that hold that lying is more difficult than truth telling, is only true in some 
situations—many lies are easier, more automatic, and more socially acceptable than truths 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2008). Finally, content analytic approaches are also dependent 
on context. For instance, Reality Monitoring is only relevant for autobiographical 
                                                          
1 Some classify Zuckerman et al.’s (1981) paper as a distinct theory of deception (e.g., Bond et al. 
2015), consisting of four elements, arousal, emotional, cognitive, and attempted control. However, 
Zuckerman et al.’s paper reads more like a summary of existing theories than an attempt to develop a 
unique four-factor model. Of note is that Zuckerman et al.’s paper highlights that these theoretical 
positions are not mutually exclusive. A broad theory of deception for example could include both a 
cognitive and emotional component.  
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statements, of which many truths and lies are not, and is likely to be less effective when 
statements concern events in the more distant past (Vrij, 2008). Of particular importance 
for the current thesis is that RM may not be applicable when judging the veracity of stated 
intentions. This is because even true statements of intent concern events that have not 
(yet) occurred. Hence, truth tellers, like liars, cannot base their statements on experienced 
events. 
The context dependency of these approaches has led some researchers to abandon 
the search for a specific theory of deception. Instead, they focus on other research 
paradigms, where deception can be understood as one facet of a broader theory. Stiff 
(1995, 1996; see also Miller, 1983) maintains that deceptive communication can be aptly 
captured by the extant theories of persuasion (for a similar argument for inter-species 
deception, see Dawkins & Krebs, 1979). It is argued that deception and persuasion have 
the same basic goal: to influence the beliefs or behaviors of others. In this light, deception 
can be understood as one strategy in the persuasion toolbox. Hence, theories and 
explanations that account for why a message is persuasive or not (e.g., Anderson, 1981; 
Burgoon & Hale, 1988; Chaiken, 1987; Eagly, Chaiken, & Wood, 1981) should likewise 
account for why a deceptive message is believed or not.  
DePaulo et al. (2003) approach deception from the perspective of self-presentation 
(DePaulo, 1992; Goffman, 1959). According to this view we are all adept social actors 
and routinely engage in impression management. Self-presentation is central to social life 
and crucial in creating and maintaining social relationships. Lying can be seen as a useful 
tool for this task. From the perspective of self-presentation, lies are common everyday 
occurrences (DePaulo et al., 1996) and cues to deceit should be weak (DePaulo et al., 
2003). At the extreme, it could be argued that all social interactions come with some form 
of self-presentation, and as such, all social-interactions involve an element of deceit 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1969).  
The persuasion and self-presentation perspectives provide interesting and novel 
insights on the topic of deception. However, neither position offers much in terms of 
aiding in the difficult task of deception detection.  
 
Empirical Research on Deception  
Traditional Approaches 
The merits of the different theoretical approaches are best seen in light of the 
extant empirical research. In the last decade or so, a number of meta-analyses have 
emerged on deception research. These have addressed issues of direct importance for the 
theoretical positions discussed above, such as cues to deceit and deception detection 
ability. Where possible, the following overview will be based on findings from these 
meta-analyses.  
To begin, research shows that people’s ability to detect deceit is poor (Aamodt & 
Custer, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Bond and DePaulo (2006) examined the accuracy 
of people’s veracity judgments in real-time situations without availing of any special aids 
(e.g., polygraphs or content analytic methods). The results, based on over 24,000 
judgments of veracity, showed a mean accuracy of approximately 54%, little better than 
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simply flipping a coin. Aamodt and Mitchell (2006) supplemented these results by 
showing that a number of plausible moderators, such as the judge’s age, expertise, 
confidence, or sex, had little effect on accuracy judgments. In a complementary study, 
Bond and DePaulo (2008) used the basic principles of psychometric theory to examine the 
influence of individual differences. They concluded that the standard deviation of judgers’ 
detection ability is less than 1%. Put differently, assuming that lie-detection ability is 
normally distributed, if “2 million judges took a test of infinite length under the usual 
conditions, we would expect less than 1 to achieve more than 58% correct” (Bond & 
DePaulo, 2008, p. 482). 
A primary reason for people’s poor deception detection ability is that cues to 
deception are weak—there is no Pinocchio’s nose. Hence, even when one attends to the 
more relevant cues to deceit, accuracy judgements remain poor (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). 
In the most extensive meta-analysis to date on cues to deceit, the predictive power of 158 
verbal and non-verbal cues, based on over 1,300 veracity assessments, were assessed 
(DePaulo et al., 2003; see also Sporer & Schwandt, 2006, 2007). No cues were uniquely 
related to deceit, most showed no relation at all, while the cues that were related typically 
showed only modest effect sizes. For example, there was no difference between liars or 
truth tellers with regard to gaze aversion, head nods, or foot or leg movements. Although 
DePaulo et al. found that some cues showed stronger effects, a recent reanalysis of the 
same data indicates that even the cues demonstrating larger effects should be interpreted 
with caution (Bond, Levine, & Hartwig, 2015). The reanalysis found a decline effect, 
where cues based on higher numbers of studies were associated with weaker effect sizes. 
Regardless of its explanation, be it publication bias (Lehrer, 2010) or regression to the 
mean (Schooler, 2011), researchers are in agreement that a decline effect should increase 
skepticism with regard to the magnitude of the observed effects. 
A number of researchers have criticized the authority of these meta-analyses. 
They highlight important limitations, such as an over-reliance on student samples 
(O’Sullivan, 2008) or the low motivation of both the senders and receivers (von Hippel & 
Trivers, 2011). A recent meta-analysis, however, demonstrated that neither motivation, 
emotion, nor the use of student samples appear to moderate the accuracy of deception 
judgements (Hartwig & Bond, 2014). Keeping a critical mind with regard to any scientific 
finding is paramount and potential limitations should always be considered. With that 
said, the current evidence points clearly towards the same conclusions: cues to deception 
are weak and unreliable, and deception detection ability, without special aids, is poor. 
Related to the theoretical positions described above, these results pose serious questions 
to theories that predict strong and reliable verbal or non-verbal cues to deceit, whether 
they are grounded in an emotional (e.g., Ekman, 1983) or cognitive perspective (e.g., 
Zuckerman et al., 1981). Positions which do not predict strong and stable cues to deceit, 
such as DePaulo et al.’s (2003) self-presentational perspective, fare much better. 
Meta-analyses focusing on other aspects of deceit have provided somewhat more 
positive results. For instance, training has shown to provide improvements in deception 
detection ability (Driskell, 2011; Frank & Feeley, 2003), particularly for the identification 
of verbal cues (Hauch, Sporer, Michael, & Meissner, 2014). However, the improvements 
were modest at best, ranging in magnitude from small to medium effects. A meta-analysis 
of computer analyzed linguistic cues to deceit found a number of differences in the way 
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that truth tellers and liars use language (Hauch, Blandón-Gitlin, et al., 2014). However, 
the strength of the linguistic cues were again quite modest and varied considerably, 
depending on which theoretical framework provided the prediction (e.g., support was 
found for a cognitive load approach, but little was found for a Reality Monitoring 
approach). Finally, although no formal meta-analysis exists, overviews of content analytic 
methods are quite positive. For instance, RM consistently results in accuracy rates in the 
60-70% range (Masip et al., 2005; Vrij, 2008), an improvement on the 54% reported by 
Bond and DePaulo (2006). The results of the overviews on training, linguistic analysis, 
and content analytic approaches indicate that verbal approaches to deception may be more 
fruitful than non-verbal approaches. Nonetheless, these far from perfect classification 
rates indicate that accurate lie detection remains an elusive task.  
 
New Directions: Strategic Interviewing 
In the studies above, the receivers are passive—they are required to make veracity 
judgements of statements that they simply receive. In such situations it is perhaps not 
surprising that veracity judgements are poor and cues to deception are weak—it seems 
that in real life one rarely uncovers lies when passively receiving statements (Park, 
Levine, McCornack, Morrison, & Ferrara, 2002). But what if the receiver was not 
passive? What if the receiver had the opportunity to question the sender? Or better still, 
what if the receiver had a systematic method of strategically interviewing the sender? It is 
such questions that a growing number of researchers have raised (e.g., Hartwig & Bond, 
2011; Levine, 2014; Vrij & Granhag, 2012; Vrij, Granhag, & Porter, 2010). Gathered 
under an umbrella term strategic interviewing, this new focus on the receiver’s 
(henceforth interviewer’s) role in unveiling deceit has been touted as a “genuine paradigm 
shift in the science of human lie detection” (Kassin, 2012, p. 118). In brief, strategic 
interviewing methods are designed to elicit new, or strengthen the otherwise weak, cues to 
deceit.  
Grounded in a cognitive approach to deception, strategic interviewing methods 
emphasize the different psychological states that truth tellers and liars inhabit. For 
example, drawing on research on self-regulation, Granhag and Hartwig (2008) explain 
how liars and truth tellers will typically face differing information management dilemmas. 
Liars, by definition, must conceal some of the information they hold and actively work 
against the interviewer uncovering it. Truth tellers, in contrast, are actively working to 
ensure that interviewers come to know what they know. As such, truth tellers are typically 
cooperative and forthcoming. This is just one example, but it emphasizes how the 
cognitive states of truth tellers and liars can differ (see also Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, 
& Doering, 2010; Jordan & Hartwig, 2013).  
On their own, however, cognitive differences between liars and truth tellers need 
not result in reliable cues to deceit, hence, the need for strategic questions. The idea is that 
the interviewer will avail of the cognitive differences between truth tellers and liars in 
order to tease out discernable and measurable cues to deceit (Vrij, 2014). Another 
important aspect of strategic interviewing is that it addresses the issue of context. For 
instance, as noted above, many have argued that lying is more cognitively demanding 
than truth telling (Zuckerman et al., 1981), but only in certain contexts (Vrij, 2008). In 
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some contexts truths may be as, or more, difficult to tell than lies. Through the use of 
strategic questioning the interviewer can constrain the context, and thereby reduce the 
occurrence of situations where truth tellers experience more cognitive load than liars (see 
the unanticipated questions approach below). 
To date, a number of strategic interview methods have been developed and 
empirically examined, including: the cognitive load approach (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 
2008); the Strategic Use of Evidence technique (Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & 
Kronkvist, 2006); the devil’s advocate approach (Leal, Vrij, Mann, & Fisher, 2010); the 
verifiability approach (Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2014); the Cognitive Interview for suspects 
(Geiselman, 2012); Assessment Criteria Indicative of Deception (Colwell, Hiscock-
Anisman, Memon, Taylor, & Prewett, 2007); and the unanticipated questions approach 
(Vrij et al., 2009). One meta-analysis has demonstrated the promise of strategic 
interviewing approaches (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2015). The meta-analysis focused 
exclusively on studies where veracity judgements were made. This included studies on 
imposing cognitive load, unanticipated questions, and methods that encouraged the 
suspects to say more (such as the Cognitive Interview for suspects). The average detection 
when availing of such strategic interviewing approaches was approximately 71%, 
markedly higher than the 56% observed when no strategic methods were used. 
The theoretical framework for true and false intentions developed below 
incorporates elements of strategic interviewing, albeit with an intention-specific 
theoretical grounding. The specific studies in this thesis rely primarily on the 
unanticipated questions approach. This necessitates a more thorough description of this 
approach (for a comprehensive overview of the other strategic interviewing methods, see 
Clemens, 2013; Vrij, 2014).  
 
The Unanticipated Questions Approach 
Research on suspects’ counter-interrogation strategies shows that truth tellers, 
taking their own credibility for granted, tend not to prepare for upcoming interviews. 
Instead, they simply rely on their memory and answer questions, in a cooperative manner, 
to the best of their ability (Granhag, Hartwig, Mac Giolla, & Clemens, 2015). Liars, in 
contrast, will prepare for an interview when given the opportunity (Hartwig, Granhag, & 
Strömwall, 2007; Hines et al., 2010). Preparation makes the cognitively demanding task 
of lying easier (Vrij et al., 2009) and accordingly, research shows that planned lies 
produce fewer cues to deceit than spontaneous lies (DePaulo et al., 2003). In addition, 
people seem to be aware of the relationship between planning and lying. In one study, 
examining students’, prison officers’, and convicted prisoners’ beliefs about deception, all 
groups emphasised the importance of preparing false statements in order to reduce cues to 
deceit (Granhag, Andersson, Strömwall, & Hartwig, 2004).  
However, liars’ preparations are dependent on correctly predicting what questions 
the interviewer will ask. The unanticipated questions approach builds on this idea, where 
the basic aim is to ask questions that an interviewee is unlikely to have prepared answers 
for. Specifically, the questions should be devised so that truth tellers can recall answers 
from memory, but liars must fabricate answers on-the-spot (Vrij et al., 2009). This should 
constrain the context, ensuring that liars find the unanticipated questions more cognitively 
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demanding and generally more difficult to answer than truth tellers. A forerunner to this 
approach is the Assessment Criteria Indicative of Deception (ACID) developed by 
Colwell and colleagues (2007). In this study, participants who completed either an 
innocuous task (truth tellers) or a mock-transgression (liars) were interviewed about their 
activities. Inspired by the Cognitive Interview (Geiselman et al., 1984), ACID included 
specific questions designed to enhance memory performance—such as asking participants 
to provide their statements in reverse chronological order. These questions aided truth 
tellers’ memory, but hampered liars’ ability to provide statements, most likely because of 
their unanticipated nature. Through the use of ACID, Colwell et al. were able to correctly 
identify 33 of 38 participants as truth tellers or liars.  
Subsequent research has shown that for anticipated questions, liars can provide 
similar answers to truth tellers on a range of measures, including length (Sooniste, 
Granhag, Knieps, & Vrij, 2013), detail (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002), and plausibility 
(Vrij, Leal, et al., 2010). In stark contrast, for unanticipated questions, truth tellers 
typically provide longer, more detailed and more plausible answers than liars (Vrij, 2014). 
Furthermore, the unanticipated questions approach is an adaptable interviewing technique 
that can make use of common contextual factors to aid in deception detection.  This 
includes situations when there are multiple suspects or where suspects are interviewed 
more than once.  
 
Consistency and Unanticipated Questions  
Lay people and legal professionals place great weight on consistency as a cue to 
deceit, typically believing the less consistent people are the more likely it is that they are 
lying (Akehurst, Köhnken, Vrij, & Bull, 1996; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003; The Global 
Deception Research Team, 2006). It is therefore unsurprising that consistency emerges as 
a frequently used and influential cue to deceit in both investigative and judicial settings 
(de Keijser, Malsch, Kranendonk, & de Gruijter, 2011; Greuel, 1992). A striking example 
is the Supreme Court of Sweden’s formal inclusion of statement consistency as a cue 
when judging the veracity of a testimony (Schelin, 2007).  
Contrary to the beliefs of both lay people and legal professionals, research has 
shown that liars can be as consistent as truth tellers with regards to both within-group 
consistency (i.e., how similar the statements of group members are) and between-
statement consistency (i.e., how similar the multiple statements of a single suspect are; 
Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003; Vredeveldt, van 
Koppen, & Granhag, 2014). The prevailing explanation for such findings is the ‘repeat vs. 
reconstruct’ hypothesis (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999, 2001). In brief, it claims that liars 
will not take their innocence for granted. For this reason, they will prepare answers for an 
interview and simply repeat them throughout multiple interviews, in an explicit attempt to 
increase between-statement consistency. In other words, liars’ answers are often based on 
well-rehearsed statements, or lie scripts (Colwell et al., 2007). This can be contrasted with 
truth tellers. Truth tellers will often take their innocence for granted (Kassin, 2005; Kassin 
& Norwick, 2004), and in turn be less likely to prepare answers. Instead, truth tellers will 
spontaneously recall their unrehearsed answers from memory. Importantly, remembering 
is a reconstructive process often accompanied by omissions and commissions (Baddeley, 
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1997; Schacter, 1999). This allows inconsistencies to creep into truth tellers’ statements. 
Taken together, this explains how liars can achieve consistency levels comparable to 
those of truth tellers. The same reasoning can be applied to within-group consistency. 
Liars, for fear of not being believed, may prepare joint statements in an explicit attempt to 
increase within-group consistency. Truth tellers will be less likely to do so, resulting in a 
natural variation between group members’ statements.  
Through the use of strategic interviewing, specifically the unanticipated questions 
approach, it is possible to take advantage of contextual factors such as groups and 
repeated interviews. For instance, in group situations, although liars may jointly prepare 
their alibis in an attempt to reduce inconsistencies between their statements, their 
preparations will be limited—they cannot attend to all relevant issues. Unanticipated 
questions capitalize on this. Inconsistencies can be elicited by asking questions unlikely to 
be covered by liars’ prepared answers. In other words, the goal is to disrupt liars’ repeat 
strategy. If framed correctly, truth tellers’ within-group consistency levels should be 
unaffected, since group members can simply recall the truth even for the unanticipated 
questions. This approach has been applied to both multiple suspects (Vrij et al., 2009) and 
repeated interviews (Leins, Fisher, & Vrij, 2012) to great effect. The results, in brief, 
showed that liars were as consistent as truth tellers, but only when answering anticipated 
questions.  
In sum, despite the myriad of theories predicting strong and reliable cues to 
deceit, meta-analyses on deception detection show otherwise, demonstrating that cues to 
deceit are faint and unreliable. Insofar as every challenge is an opportunity, these findings 
have spurred researchers in new directions such as strategic interviewing methods. 
Although still in its infancy, strategic interviewing has shown great promise. The current 
thesis builds on these strategic interviewing methods by applying them within a 
theoretical framework of true and false intentions—the topic focused on next.  
 
True and False Intentions 
To reiterate, lies come in many different forms which has resulted in a number of 
different deception theories. These theories, however, have overlooked one important 
facet of lies, namely, that they can refer to past or future actions (Granhag, 2010). In the 
following sections it is argued that a focus on statements concerning future actions (i.e., 
statements of intent) can provide unique insights into deception detection.  
 
Defining Intent 
In this thesis I will rely on the definition of intent provided by Malle and Knobe 
(1997, 2001). The authors adopted a folk-conceptual approach that relies on collating 
people’s intuitive understanding of a term (this can be contrasted with the normative 
approach of philosophical enquiry; e.g., Anscombe, 1957; for an overview see Setiya, 
2015). This analysis resulted in three necessary tenets of intent. First, an intention 
involves the desire to attain some future goal or state—an intention is goal directed (I 
intend to watch a movie on Friday night). Importantly, the content of an intention must 
also refer to a person’s own actions (although you can desire that someone goes to the 
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movies, you cannot intend them to). Second, the action to be performed must have 
received a minimum degree of reasoning. This includes a weighing up of one’s desires 
(what else do I want to do on Friday night?), and an assessment of one’s abilities and 
resources (can I afford to see a move on Friday night?). The final tenet of an intention is 
the degree of commitment. In brief, higher commitment (I’ve already bought my ticket for 
Friday night) is a stronger sign of intention formation than lower commitment (I haven’t 
fully decided if I’m going yet). Therefore, an intention is formed when it refers to one’s 
own actions, has received some degree of reasoning, and is accompanied by a strong 
degree of commitment to carry out the action. This puts an intention at the end of a causal 
deliberation process that precedes a goal directed action. 
 
Figure 1. Components of an intention as identified by Malle and Knobe (1997, 2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model depicted in Figure 1, however, leaves the intentional act ambiguous in 
many regards. For instance, the intended act can be planned for the near or distant future, 
it can be straight-forward or complex, and abstract or concrete. In order to create a 
coherent research agenda, Granhag (2010) therefore suggested an initial delineation, by 
providing a restricted, working definition, of intent. Granhag defined an intention as a 
planned single act to be performed in the near future. It is this refined working definition 
that will be used throughout the thesis.  
Based on this stricter account, a statement of true intent refers to a single act one 
genuinely plans to perform in the near future. In contrast, a statement of false intent refers 
to a single act one claims, but does not in fact intend to perform in the near future. Though 
false intentions can occur in different guises (Mac Giolla, Granhag, & Vrij, 2015), a 
common use, and the focus of this thesis, is a cover-story. That is, a false statement about 
your future actions is given to mask the actual actions (e.g., criminal actions) you intend 
to carry out (for the related research field on uncovering concealed criminal intentions see 
Burgoon et al., 2009; Koller, Wetter, & Hofer, 2015a, 2015b). Although non-verbal false 
intentions can be imagined (e.g., the footballer who feigns the direction of her run), the 
focus of the extant research on true and false intentions, and of the current thesis, is on 
verbal statements of intent.  
 
Research on True and False Intentions 
The first studies on true and false intentions focused simply on (1) the ability to 
detect deceit when no specific methods are used (Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011) and 
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(2) how, in such situations, accuracy of veracity judgments compare to veracity judgments 
of statements about past events (Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Granhag, 2011).The first study 
resulted in a discrimination accuracy of approximately 70% (Vrij, Granhag, et al., 2011). 
This is markedly higher than what is typically found in deception studies, where accuracy 
rates are often little better than chance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). This finding was 
corroborated in the second study (Vrij, Leal, et al., 2011). Again, accuracy rates, 
discriminating statements of true and false intent, were approximately 70%. In contrast, 
and in line with previous research, an accuracy rate of approximately 55% was found for 
true and false statements of past events. These studies, however, say little with regard to 
theory, and accuracy rates based on merely two studies should always be interpreted with 
caution. Nonetheless, the accuracy rates hint at the possibility that true and false 
statements about future and past events may differ in some way.  
Subsequent studies can be classified into two broad approaches. In the first 
approach, researchers have extended traditional deception detection techniques, that is, 
techniques that are typically used on statements about past events, to situations of intent 
(for a review, see Granhag & Mac Giolla, 2014). These advances have been made with 
mostly promising results. For instance, the Strategic Use of Evidence technique (Clemens, 
Granhag, & Strömwall, 2011); the Concealed Information Test (Meijer, Smulders, & 
Merckelbach, 2010; Meijer, Verschuere, & Merckelbach, 2010; Meixner & Rosenfeld, 
2011; Noordraven & Verschuere, 2013); the autobiographical Implicit Association Test 
(Agosta, Castiello, Rigoni, Lionetti, & Sartori, 2011); and the Sheffield Lie-Test 
(Suchotzki, Verschuere, Crombez, & De Houwer, 2013) have all been successfully 
adapted to distinguish between statements of true and false intent in laboratory settings. 
Other approaches, however, have not fared so well. This includes techniques based on 
thermal imaging (Warmelink et al., 2011) and predictions about eye movements derived 
from Neuro Linguistic Programing theory (Mann, Vrij, Nasholm, et al., 2012; for a more 
promising approach to eye movements and true and false intentions derived from research 
on counter-interrogation strategies see Mann, Vrij, Leal, et al., 2012). Deception detection 
techniques are likely to extend successfully to situations of intent when there is a sound 
underlying theory that is independent of whether statements concern past or future events.  
In the second approach, researchers have sought to develop distinct methods of 
deception detection based on the unique properties of intentions. These methods are based 
on the same basic line of reasoning. First, an intention is a unique psychological construct 
that is typically accompanied by a host of related constructs (e.g., goals) and behavioral 
consequences (e.g., in-depth planning). Second, it is assumed that these concomitants of 
intent should be more salient for those with a true intention compared to those with a false 
intention. In other words, liars will not engage to the same extent as truth tellers in the 
varying activities and consequences typically associated with the formation of an 
intention. These discrepancies can in turn be exploited by strategic interviewing methods, 
by highlighting new intention-specific cues to deceit, or by a combination of the two 
(Granhag & Mac Giolla, 2014; Mac Giolla, Granhag, & Vrij, 2015). In the following 
sections I will outline a number of important concomitants of intent and corresponding 
fields of research. Following this, I will attempt to integrate these seemingly disparate 
areas and, in doing so, take the first steps towards a theory of true and false intentions.  
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Consequences and Concomitants of Intentions 
Malle and Knobe’s (1997, 2001) account of intentions highlights the important 
point that intentions are composed of and accompanied by related psychological 
constructs such as goals. However, the three requisites of intentions highlighted in Figure 
1 (above), goals, reasoning, and commitment, should only be seen as the basic 
requirements of intent. There is likely to be a number of other typical concomitants and 
effects associated with the formation of an intention. These range from general behavioral 
effects, such as tendency to plan (Mumford, Schultz, & Van Doorn, 2001), to specific 
cognitive phenomena, such as episodic future thought (Szpunar, 2010). The examples that 
follow are not an exhaustive list of fields of research relevant for intentions. Rather, they 
represent the areas that have thus far received attention from researchers of true and false 
intent. 
 
Intentions and goals. Intentions are goal directed. They are performed to attain a 
desired end-state (Malle & Knobe, 1997). Hence, an unfulfilled intention implies an 
active goal. Whether conscious (Ajzen, 1991) or not (Bargh & Huang, 2009), active goals 
influence our behavior in unique and predictable ways (Förster, Liberman, & Friedman, 
2007; Martin & Tesser, 2009). Martin and Tesser list five markers of motivated behavior: 
persistence-until (that goals remain active until they are attained); equifinality (that 
different actions can be performed to attain the same outcome); docility (that avenues of 
action shown to be unhelpful in goal attainment are abandoned while more successful 
avenues are retained); affect (that goal attainment in and of itself is associated with 
satisfaction); and effort (a balance is made between the value of the goal and the difficulty 
in achieving it).  
As well as these broad markers, active goals have specific behavioral 
consequences. Amongst other things, active goals influence our memory, attention, and 
evaluative judgements. For instance, attention is drawn towards goal related objects 
(Moskowitz, 2002; Rothermund, 2003). Similarly, information related to active goals 
shows a heightened activation and accessibility in our minds (see the intention superiority 
effect; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993; Penningroth, 2005) and is better remembered than 
information related to completed goals (Zeigarnik, 1939). Research also shows that 
interpretation of ambiguous stimuli is based on active goals, and in a manner likely to 
facilitate goals (Strachman & Gable, 2006; Voss, Rothermund, & Brandtstädter, 2008).  
For example, in one study participants engaged in a color discrimination task, where one 
color indicated a financial gain and another color indicated a financial loss. In trials where 
the color was ambiguous, participants had an increased tendency to interpret it as the 
color indicating a financial gain, thereby, demonstrating a motivational bias (Voss et al., 
2008). Similarly, with regard to judgements, objects are evaluated based on their utility 
for an active goal (Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2003; De Houwer, 2009; Ferguson, 
2007), with some arguing that most, if not all, evaluative judgments are made in light of 
some goal (Markman & Brendl, 2000). Hence our preference for a cold drink on a hot 
day, or why an Allen key is preferred over a hammer when assembling IKEA furniture.  
Furthermore, these behavioral consequences, as well as goal activation, and goal 
pursuit, can occur outside of conscious awareness (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). 
Researchers have taken this as evidence of the particular proficiency of the human mind 
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to pursue goals. Although attributing a particular significance to goals is by no means new 
(e.g., Lewin, 1935; Tolman, 1932), the growing body of research on non-conscious goal 
pursuit has led some researchers to the extreme position that active goals are the primary 
“unit of control over higher mental processes, not the self or individual person” (Bargh & 
Huang, 2009, p.131; see also Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Bargh, Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, 
Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; Bargh, Green, & Fitzsimons, 2008). Regardless of whether 
or not one is an advocate of the radical position of Bargh and colleagues, it is doubtless 
that goals have a particular and significant influence on behavior. Insofar as intentions 
activate goals, any expected consequences of active goals are also expected to accompany 
intentions.  
 
Intentions and planning. The exact relationship between planning and intent 
remains an open question. As noted, some basic degree of reasoning is necessary for an 
intention (see Figure 1). Whether such deliberation should be seen as a plan—specifically, 
a more detailed action plan—is debatable (Malle & Knobe, 2001). Regardless of whether 
a plan is a necessary component of an intention, researchers are in agreement that plans 
can and often do accompany intentions (Harman, 1986; Malle & Knobe, 2001; Mele, 
1992). To further complicate matters, the relationship between planning and intentions is 
not unidirectional. For instance, plans developed during the reasoning phase may lead to 
intentions. Alternatively, a fully formed intention may be the catalyst in the development 
of more detailed plans (Malle & Knobe, 2001).  
An informative distinction is made by Gollwitzer (1999), who refers to goal 
intentions and implementation intentions. Goal intentions simply refer to the ‘what’ (e.g., 
I intend to lose weight), and, as such, are similar to the concept of intentions in Figure 1. 
Implementation intentions are concrete ‘if-then’ plans. They include the what, where, 
when and how of goal attainment (e.g., I intend to lose weight by going for a 30 min jog 
every morning at 7 a.m.). Simple goal intentions are notoriously weak, and do not 
necessarily lead to action (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Sheeran, 2002). More specific 
action plans, such as implementation intentions, help people overcome this intention-
behavior gap (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006). However, the creation of such specific plans 
is unlikely, if a goal intention has not been formed (Sheeran, Milne, Webb, & Gollwitzer, 
2005). Thus, detailed plans can be seen as an important, though perhaps non-essential, 
component in the initiation of goal directed action.  
 
Future oriented thought. Just as planning is a typical concomitant of intentions, 
episodic future thought (EFT) is a typical, often automatic, concomitant of planning. EFT 
refers to our ability to pre-experience future events through mental simulation, with a 
strong focus on visual imagery (Atance & O'Neill, 2001). EFTs differ from other forms of 
future thinking or mental time travel (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997) insofar as they are 
self-directed and concern specific future instances (Szpunar, 2010). In this sense they are 
analogous to episodic memory. While episodic memory refers to memories of 
autobiographical events that occurred at a specific time and place, EFT refers to 
autobiographical events at a specific time and place sometime in the future. The link 
between EFT and episodic memory is furthered by research demonstrating that our 
databank of memories provides the building blocks for future thinking. That is, memories 
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of past events are used to create mental representations of the future (Schacter, Addis, & 
Buckner, 2008).  
An important function of episodic future thought is to aid in planning and goal 
attainment (Schacter et al., 2008; Szpunar, 2010). Through mental simulation one can pre-
experience an event, or test alternative scenarios, which can help one prepare for potential 
problems and opportunities during task performance (Schacter et al., 2008). Put 
differently, through mental simulation one can practice an activity without the strains, 
risks, or resources needed to physically rehearse the activity. EFTs are also related to 
other forms of future-oriented thought, such as prospective memory, our ability to 
remember to carry out our intentions (Meacham & Singer, 1977; for a review see 
Brandimonte, Einstein, & McDaniel, 2014). Prospective memory is crucial for action 
initiation and, therefore, is of great importance for any theory of intent. Through mental 
imagery, it is thought that EFT can aid prospective memory by allowing individuals to 
better recognize specific environmental cues for action initiation (Schacter et al., 2008). In 
sum, EFTs are a common concomitant of planning, and in turn, of intentions, that are 
thought to aid in the planning process.   
 
Construal Level Theory. Whereas the focus until now has been on behavioral and 
cognitive consequences of intentions, Construal Level Theory (CLT) provides a basic 
framework for understanding how people represent intentions in their minds. CLT was 
developed to systematize and explain how one represents situations that are not in the here 
and now, such as memories of past actions and thoughts about future ones (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010). CLT holds that, with oneself as an egocentric reference point, objects 
can be more or less psychologically distant. Psychological distance in turn affects how we 
represent objects: psychologically proximal objects are represented by concrete lower-
level mental construals, while psychologically distant objects are represented by abstract 
higher-level construals (Trope & Liberman, 2010). Four forms of psychological distance 
have been proposed: social, temporal, spatial, and hypothetical (Soderberg, Callahan, 
Kochersberger, Amit, & Ledgerwood, 2014). It is the latter three forms that are 
particularly relevant for intentions. For example, intended actions can occur in the near or 
distant future, they can be performed close by or far away, and they can come with 
different levels of commitment influencing the likelihood (hypotheticality) of carrying out 
the intention. A recent meta-analysis has demonstrated a reliable medium sized effect of 
psychological distance on mental construals that has been replicated across time, 
researchers and settings (Soderberg et al., 2014). In line with CLT, the results demonstrate 
that psychologically distant objects are represented more abstractly than psychologically 
proximal objects. This finding held for all four types of psychological distance.  
Research on CLT has also shown a host of ‘downstream consequences’, in other 
words, secondary effects of the level of mental construal. When related to intentions, 
these downstream consequences can influence such things as predictions of task 
performance, what elements of the future act one focuses on, and intention choice. For 
example, people are more confident about their performance ability (e.g., on a test) in the 
distant vs. the near future (Nussbaum, Liberman, & Trope, 2006). For intentions in the 
distant future, people also place more importance on the desirability of end states, 
compared to the steps involved in attaining the end states. The opposite is true for 
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intentions in the near future, where the concrete steps command relatively more attention 
than the desirability of the end state (Liberman & Trope, 1998). This in turn can have 
concrete effects on more explicit behavior such as intention choice. For example, the 
number of hours people were willing to volunteer increased the further in the future the 
volunteering was to take place (Eyal, Sagristano, Trope, Liberman, & Chaiken, 2009). As 
with the effect of psychological distance on mental construals, Soderberg et al. (2014) 
found a reliable and medium sized effect of mental construal on downstream 
consequences.  
 
Towards a Theoretical Framework of True and False Intentions 
To reiterate, intentions necessarily imply the activation of goals. Goals in turn 
influence how we engage with the world. Goals are the catalyst for planning, they 
determine what information in our environment is most salient, they influence how we 
evaluate objects, and they indirectly give rise to phenomena such as episodic future 
thoughts. Though seemingly disparate, these differing concomitants of goals, and thus 
intentions, have a single common element: they all aid in goal attainment. It is 
unnecessary to point out that planning aids in goal attainment (Mumford et al., 2001) and 
the more detailed the plan the better (Gollwitzer, 1999). The more automated 
concomitants and indirect consequences, of goal directed behavior, also aid in goal 
attainment. For instance, the increased salience of goal related information allows one to 
more quickly react to opportunities or hazards in the environment. Similarly, the 
evaluation of objects based on their respective utility for active goals lets one know which 
objects will aid or hinder goal attainment—which objects to approach or avoid (De 
Houwer, 2009). By providing the opportunity to practice the event through mental 
simulation, episodic future thoughts are also expected to aid in goal attainment (Schacter 
et al., 2008). Even Construal Level Theory can be understood from a goal perspective. For 
example, people tend to have more positive representations of distant goals. This may be 
necessary to maintain interest in the distant goal. However, as the goal approaches the 
representation becomes more realistic, highlighting instead concrete aspects, such as 
specific obstacles that need to be overcome in order to achieve the goal (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010). 
The crucial point is that a stated false intention, by definition, does not include the 
activation of a goal. Since there is no goal to obtain, it follows that the consequences of 
intention formation, that might aid in goal attainment, are no longer functional. These 
consequences become unnecessary, superfluous. In other words, false intentions should 
not naturally be accompanied by the direct and indirect trademarks of goal-directed 
behavior. Therefore the predictable concomitants of true intentions should be weaker or 
nonexistent for those expressing a false intention. For example, those expressing a false 
intention should be less likely to create detailed plans for how to carry out their stated 
intentions, information in the environment should not be processed in relation to their 
stated intentions, and they should be less likely to experience episodic future thoughts 
related to their claimed future activity.  
As an example, consider the false intention uttered by 17 year old John. John tells 
his parents that he intends to go to the cinema on Friday night, as a cover-story to mask 
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his genuine intention of going to a house party on Friday night. Since going to the cinema 
is John’s false intention, the typical consequences of goal directed behavior should not be 
associated with it. With regards to planning, John’s plans to go to the cinema should be 
limited in depth. He may not have considered which snacks to buy or that the queues most 
Friday nights will require that he arrives 10 minutes earlier than on any other day. 
Similarly, information in the environment should not be processed in relation to John’s 
stated false intention. For example, objects should not be evaluated based on the goal to 
go to the cinema: John may for instance show a neutral evaluation of a cinema ticket. 
Finally, it is less likely that John will have episodic future thoughts about going to the 
cinema. It is, for instance, less likely that he momentarily imagines the taste of buttery 
popcorn, which reminds him of the importance of bringing an extra napkin. These 
functional consequences of intention formation are simply unnecessary for John’s stated 
false intention, and hence should be less pronounced compared to if he genuinely was 
going to the cinema. Cognitive resources are limited, and it seems unwise to spend them 
on goals never intended to be achieved. 
Of course, although not stated, John has a true intention: to go to the house party. 
The consequences of goal directed behavior should therefore exist for this hidden, 
genuine intention, but not for the stated false intention. So, instead of snacks for the 
cinema, John may consider which drinks to buy for the party, he may evaluate a six pack 
of beer as more positive than a cinema ticket, and he may be more likely to imagine the 
taste of alcohol rather than buttery popcorn, which reminds him to bring a pack of 
chewing gum to cover the smell of alcohol on his breath from his parents.   
Those with a false intention can always attempt to impersonate truth tellers by 
claiming to have engaged in or experienced the expected consequences of genuine 
intentions. However, this impersonation is dependent on an accurate understanding of the 
typical behavior of those with a true intention. Basic psychological research on intentions 
allows one to paint a fuller and more nuanced picture of someone with a true intention. 
The more detailed this picture becomes the more difficult it becomes for liars to depict it. 
This echoes the sentiment in Granhag’s (2010) seminal paper on true and false intentions. 
Using an analogy of counterfeit money, Granhag explains that one cannot recognize a 
fake coin until one can recognize a genuine one. Hence, the first task of a research agenda 
of true and false intentions is to examine trademarks of true intentions. Granhag, however, 
is less clear on where to look for such trademarks. I argue that the trademarks of most 
diagnostic value will be those related to goal-directed behavior, specifically, the 
predictable consequences that aid in goal attainment. This is because these consequences 
should be less likely to naturally occur for those stating a false intention.    
 
Looking For and Eliciting Trademarks of True Intent 
The question still remains how one should discriminate between statements of 
true and false intent. One approach is simply to look for verbal trademarks of true 
intentions in statements of intent. This would fit into the tradition of verbal content 
analytic approaches (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Steller & Köhnken, 1989) or the more 
automated linguistic analytic methods (Hauch, Blandón-Gitlin, et al., 2014). A central 
tenet of these approaches is that liars’ approximations of true statements will be limited in 
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some regards. This may be because the cognitive sources of lies differ from truths 
(Johnson & Raye, 1981; Masip et al., 2005) or because they hold misconceptions 
concerning what a truthful account should consist of (DePaulo et al., 2003). In the context 
of true and false intentions it should be language, indicative of goal-directed behavior, 
that is sought for. For example, statements of true intent may include more detailed or 
visual descriptions of the future event, since those with a true intention are more likely to 
experience episodic future thoughts related to their intentions.  
With that said, the meta-analyses on deception, discussed above, highlight how 
faint and unreliable cues to deceit typically are. Therefore, a second approach is to 
combine the basic idea of focusing on markers of goal-directed behavior with the new 
wave of strategic interviewing techniques in order to enhance expected differences 
between truth tellers and liars. For example, questions can be devised to encourage 
expected tendencies of those with a true intention. Consider again the concept of episodic 
future thought. It might be that in open ended statements describing their intentions, 
neither truth tellers nor liars provide cues suggestive of having experienced episodic 
future thought. In such situations it may be necessary for an interviewer to pose more 
specific questions in order to elicit statements on the topic. 
 
Empirical Support for the Framework 
Ask, Granhag, Juhlin, and Vrij (2013) examined one known consequence of goal 
directed behavior, namely that goals influence our evaluative judgements of objects. The 
study built on the finding that objects are implicitly evaluated based on their utility for 
active goals (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004). Ask et al. proposed that this consequence of goal 
directed behavior would hold true for those with a true intention, but not for those with a 
false intention. Results from an evaluative priming task demonstrated that truth tellers 
showed implicit positive evaluations of goal-facilitative stimuli. In contrast, those with a 
false intention, showed a neutral evaluation of the same stimuli, in accordance with 
someone who would not have an active goal.  
Knieps and colleagues (Granhag & Knieps, 2011; Knieps, Granhag, & Vrij, 
2013a, 2013b) focused on episodic future thoughts. In their studies truth tellers planned a 
shopping trip to a nearby shopping mall. Liars planned a mock-crime to be carried out in 
the shopping mall, and a cover-story, structurally similar to the truth tellers’ task, in order 
to mask their intended actions. The cover-story was their false intention. Self-report 
measures showed that truth tellers were more likely to have EFTs, and to have clearer 
EFTs related to the shopping task, than liars. In addition, the series of studies provides 
strong and consistent support that, during an investigative interview, truth tellers are more 
likely to report that they experienced a mental image while planning their future action. 
Across the studies, approximately 95% of truth tellers reported experiencing a mental 
image, compared to about 70% of liars. Hence, if suspects do not report that they had a 
mental image activated during the planning phase, they are most likely lying about their 
stated intentions. Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, and Granhag (2013) extended the results of 
Knieps and colleagues by further probing mental images with more specific questions. 
For example, questions were included that concerned spatial and temporal aspects of the 
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mental image. The results showed that truth tellers’ descriptions of their mental images 
were more precise than those of liars, and included more spatial and temporal details.   
The studies by Ask et al (2013), Knieps and colleagues (Granhag & Knieps, 2011; 
Knieps et al., 2013a, 2013b) and Warmelink et al. (2013) are all in accordance with the 
suggested framework described above. They all focus on expected consequences of 
intentions that aid in goal attainment and demonstrate that these consequences are more 
pronounced for truth tellers compared to liars. According to the proposed framework, this 
is because these consequences do not inherently accompany stated false intentions, since 
their value is lost on people with no active goal. Liars’ attempts to approximate truth 
tellers are in turn limited, resulting in the observed discrepancies.  
 
Why a Theory of True and False Intentions? 
Competing theories on cues to deception are abundant, and the damning results of 
meta-analyses have even led some researchers to completely abandon the search for 
traditional cues to deceit (Levine, 2014). Therefore, it seems necessary to justify an 
attempted development of yet another theory of deception cues. The value of a theory of 
true and false intentions is twofold. Firstly, a recent meta-analysis on multiple cues to 
deceit demonstrates that lies can be detected with about 70% accuracy when multiple 
rather than single cues are used (Hartwig & Bond, 2014). By discovering novel intention-
specific cues to deceit, it may be possible to increase the situations when relevant multiple 
cues can be examined and combined. Secondly, if a sufficient number of stable and 
generalizable cues, indicative of true and false intent, can be discovered, it may be 
possible to develop more standardized content analytic procedures or to aid intention-
specific strategic interviewing methods. This would be useful since, as noted above, there 
are theoretical limitations in extending a number of established content analytic methods 
to true and false intent situations. These methods include Reality Monitoring (RM; 
Sporer, 2004) and Criteria Based Content Analysis (CBCA; Steller & Köhnken, 1989). 
The difficulty in extending these techniques to intent situations is that both RM and 
CBCA focus on distinguishing experienced events from events that were not experienced 
(e.g., invented). Hence, a strong focus of both procedures is on truth telling cues that are 
related to the act of perceiving. However, in intent situations, truth tellers have no direct 
perceptual information to rely on, since the event has yet to occur. In accordance, research 
has demonstrated that mental images of future events tend to be generally less detailed 
than mental images of past events (D’Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2004; Gamboz et 
al., 2010). Hence, established content analytic techniques may be difficult to apply in 
intent situations since both true and false intentions are derived from cognitive rather than 
perceptual operations. Relatedly, despite promising developments in strategic 
interviewing techniques (Vrij et al., 2015), others have found it problematic when 
applying these techniques to true and false intentions (Fenn et al., 2015). A theory of true 
and false intentions has the potential to overcome such issues by providing a new focus 
for content analytic and strategic interviewing methods grounded in basic research on 
intentions. 
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Background to the Studies 
Based on this theoretical framework, the goal of the current thesis is to examine 
other expected consequences of intentions. The specific aim is to examine potential 
differences in planning behavior and to what extent people experience spontaneous 
thoughts related to their stated intentions. The studies on planning focus on how 
differences in truth tellers’ and liars’ planning behavior could result in differences in their 
statements of intent. The studies on spontaneous thought are akin to Knieps and 
colleagues’ research on EFT (Knieps, 2013), in assuming that truth tellers will be more 
likely to experience spontaneous thought related to their stated intentions compared to 
liars, and hence be more willing and able to answer questions concerning such thoughts in 
an interview.  
 
Truth Tellers as Good Planners  
It is argued that planning, as an important instrument of goal attainment, will be 
engaged in to a greater extent by truth tellers (those with a stated true intention) compared 
to liars (those with a stated false intention). This is not to say that liars will not plan. 
Rather, liars’ planning is primarily expected to be directed at their cover-stories and will 
be less focused on the concrete steps needed to attain the end states of their stated, but 
false, intentions. This is because detailed planning aimed to aid goal attainment is surplus 
to liars’ needs. Put differently, it is argued that false intentions, or prepared cover-stories, 
are less likely to address the planning phase of a stated intention. Terrorist manuals (e.g., 
the Breivik Manifesto; The Manchester Manual; The IRA Green Book) provide tentative 
support and external validity for this position. Although these manuals encourage people 
to prepare cover-stories and answers to specific questions, they explicitly concern the 
future action of the intention, rather than specific planning that would typically be needed 
to perform the action. Sooniste (2015) framed the situation in terms of bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1978). In this view, liars will satisfice more than truth tellers. Their preparations 
will be ‘good enough’ to create a believable cover-story. In contrast, truth tellers’ 
preparations should focus on achieving the end state of their intentions. Hence, truth 
tellers will be more likely to optimize, that is, be more likely to focus on the concrete 
steps necessary to attain the end states and to engage in detailed planning behavior.  
Based on the premise that truth tellers will engage in more in-depth planning, it 
follows that truth tellers will produce better plans than liars. In turn, it is argued that the 
discrepancies between truth tellers’ and liars’ planning behavior may lead to differences 
in interview statements. Specifically, truth tellers’ statements should be colored by 
markers of good planning behavior to a greater extent than liars’ statements. 
Psychological research on planning provides insights into what constitutes good planning 
behavior (Mumford et al., 2001) and in turn which markers to look for. One example is 
the previously discussed concept of implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999). Such 
plans, since they aid in goal attainment, can be seen as better plans than the ones that do 
not emphasize the where, when, and how of goal attainment. Furthermore, as noted above, 
they are unlikely to be formed unless a goal intention has been formed (Sheeran et al., 
2005). This indicates that liars (who have not formed a goal intention) should be less 
likely than truth tellers (who have formed a goal intention) to produce implementation 
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intentions. Other research suggests that good plans are efficient (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-
Roth, 1979), flexible (Keane, 1996), consider alternatives (Kreitler & Kreitler, 1987) and 
anticipate possible problems (Xiao, Milgram, & Doyle, 1997) (for an overview see, 
Mumford et al., 2001). The goal of Study I was to examine if such cues, indicative of 
good planning behavior, would be more common in truth tellers’ statements compared to 
liars’ statements.  
 
Addressing the Planning Phase with Unanticipated Questions 
Another approach is to avail of strategic interviewing methods to exploit the 
expected differences in truth tellers’ and liars’ planning behavior. For instance, planning 
can be used as a theme for unanticipated questions. In an intentions scenario, questions on 
the topic of one’s intentions can be seen as anticipated (e.g., What do you intend to do on 
your trip?), while questions on the planning of the intentions can be seen as unanticipated 
(e.g., How did you go about planning for your trip?). That is, liars’ cover-stories are likely 
to address what the intended actions concern, but are perhaps less likely to address the 
planning that would typically precede such actions. Research has demonstrated that truth 
tellers and liars provide similar answers for the anticipated questions on intentions. For 
the unanticipated questions on planning, however, truth tellers tend to provide longer and 
more detailed answers compared to liars (Sooniste et al., 2013; Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, 
Jundi, & Granhag, 2012).   
As noted, the unanticipated questions approach is a versatile technique. It is 
particularly suited to certain contextual variables, including groups of suspects and 
repeated interviews, since it can disrupt a liar’s strategy of relaying prepared answers. 
Sooniste, Granhag, Strömwall, and Vrij (2014) examined whether this would also hold for 
situations of intent, where planning was the theme for the unanticipated questions. 
Participants planned activities in either groups of two or four. This allowed for a measure 
of within-group consistency. This measure was based on the participants’ answers to the 
open questions on intent and the open questions on the planning phase. Results, as 
predicted, showed that truth tellers’ and liars’ had comparable levels of within-group 
consistency for the questions on intent (anticipated questions). However, truth tellers were 
more consistent than liars for the questions on the planning phase (unanticipated 
questions). The goal of Study II in this thesis was to extend this line of research by 
examining whether planning can be used as a theme for unanticipated questions when 
suspects are not only members of groups, but are also interviewed more than once. This 
set-up allows for the examination of both within-group and between-statement 
consistency across anticipated and unanticipated questions.  
  
Intentions and Spontaneous Thoughts 
Spontaneous thoughts go by many names, including day dreaming, thought 
intrusions, undirected thought and mind wandering. Although subtle differences may exist 
between these definitions, the umbrella term of spontaneous thought refers to thoughts 
that occur involuntarily and are not directly related to any task at hand (Christoff, Gordon, 
& Smith, 2011). The ubiquity of spontaneous thought is astonishing, with research 
demonstrating that undirected thoughts can account for as much as 30% of people’s 
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conscious awareness (Kane et al., 2007; Klinger & Cox, 1987). Because of their 
association with failures of cognitive control (McVay & Kane, 2010) and obsessive 
intrusive thoughts (Clark & Purdon, 1995), spontaneous thought is often cast in a negative 
light. Others, however, are as quick to champion the positives. They argue that humans 
would not have developed this curious phenomenon if it did not carry some functional 
value (McMillan, Kaufman, & Singer, 2013; Mooneyham & Schooler, 2013). Related to 
intentions, it appears that spontaneous thoughts can aid in problem solving (Christoff et 
al., 2011; see also research on insight, Dorfman, Shames, & Kihlstrom, 1996) and the 
anticipation and planning of future goals (Baird, Smallwood, & Schooler, 2011). In 
otherwords, spontaneous thoughts can aid in goal attainment. 
When seen in the light of non-conscious goal pursuit (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999), 
spontaneous thought can be understood as the temporary, conscious awareness of offline 
cognitive processing related to an unfinished goal (Christoff et al., 2011). This position is 
strengthened by neuroimaging research demonstrating that spontaneous thoughts activate 
brain regions that overlap with those activated during goal-directed thought (Christoff, 
Ream, & Gabrieli, 2004). With this in mind, it should come as no surprise that unfinished 
intentions, or unfinished tasks, can generate spontaneous thoughts (Masicampo & 
Baumeister, 2011; Morsella, Ben-Zeev, Lanska, & Bargh, 2010). Just as with planning, 
EFT, and other markers of goal directed behavior, it is argued that the functional value of 
spontaneous thought is lost on those with a false intention. Hence, people stating a true 
intention should be more likely to experience spontaneous thoughts relating to their stated 
intention in comparison to people stating a false intention. Study III examined this 
proposition.  
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SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Study I 
The aim of the first study was to test the hypothesis that truth tellers’ statements 
would be colored by markers of good planning behavior to a higher degree than liars’ 
statements. Three markers (cues) were examined. The first cue was plan efficiency: 
specifically, whether participants mentioned that tasks were delegated to group members. 
The second cue was problem-related language: whether participants had envisioned any 
potential problems, and whether they had prepared any alternative plans. The third cue 
was related to implementation intentions. It was suggested that truth tellers’ statements 
would consist of proportionately more how-related utterings than liars’ statements. How-
related utterings only partly measured implementation intentions, since the other 
components of such detailed plans (i.e., the what, where, and when) had already been 
decided upon in the instructions. In contrast, it was suggested that liars’ statements would 
consist of proportionately more why-related utterings than truth tellers’ statements. This 
was because liars, who may not take their own credibility for granted (Vrij et al., 2008), 
may feel a greater need to justify their future actions. 
 
Method 
The study used the same design developed by Sooniste et al. (2014), which in turn 
was an extension of the approach devised by Granhag and Knieps (2011). Participants (N 
= 132, 93 women, Mage = 27.20, SD = 9.64) were first divided into triads of truth tellers or 
liars. Truth tellers planned a non-criminal act (to host a traditional Swedish lunch). Liars 
planned a mock-crime that involved collecting items from a nearby shopping center. In 
addition, liars were told to prepare a cover-story in case they were apprehended, the theme 
of which was to be identical to the truth tellers’ task. The cover-story was the false 
intention.  Participants were apprehended and interviewed before they could begin their 
intended actions. The answers to the open questions on participants’ intentions (“Please 
tell me, in as much detail as possible, what you had intended to do in the shopping 
center?”) were coded for implementation-related utterings and whether participants had 
decided to delegate tasks between group members. The problem-related language was 
derived from yes/no answers to specific questions during the interview (“Did you expect 
any problems to arise during your trip to the shopping center?”; “Did you develop any 
alternative plans—that is, did you have a plan B?”). 
 
Results and Discussion 
Results largely support the hypotheses. Compared to liars, truth tellers’ statements 
consisted of more how-related utterances, they were more likely to delegate tasks, and 
they were more likely to speak of potential problems. Liars’ statements, in contrast, 
consisted of proportionately more why-related utterances. Against predictions, veracity 
had no effect on whether or not participants claimed to have developed alternative plans. 
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Nonetheless, the results, by and large, support the hypothesis that truth tellers’ answers 
would be colored to a greater extent by markers of good planning behavior. 
 
Study II 
The aim of Study II was to examine how anticipated and unanticipated questions 
influence the within-group consistency and between-statement consistency of statements 
of true and false intent. Study II consisted of two experiments. Experiment 1 aimed to 
replicate the findings of Sooniste et al. (2014) but with groups of three, rather than pairs 
and quartets. The primary hypothesis concerned within-group consistency. Based on 
previous studies (e.g., Sooniste et al., 2014) it was expected that truth tellers would have 
higher within-group consistency, but only for the questions on planning (the unanticipated 
questions). For questions on intentions (the anticipated questions) no such differences 
were expected (Hypothesis 1). Experiment 2 extended the design to account for multiple 
suspects and multiple interviews. Here, suspects, who were members of groups of three, 
were each interviewed three times. Here, the hypothesis of primary interest concerned 
between-statement consistency. Again, truth tellers were expected to be more consistent 
than liars but only for the questions on planning (Hypothesis 2). Finally, based on 
theoretical reasoning and empirical findings (Granhag, Mac Giolla, Strömwall, & 
Rangmar, 2013; Sooniste et al., 2014), it was expected that truth tellers would provide 
longer answers to both the unanticipated and anticipated questions; however, the 
differences were expected to be larger for the unanticipated questions (Hypothesis 3).  
 
Method  
The data for Study II, Experiment I (N = 132, 93 women, Mage = 27.20, SD = 
9.64), came from the same data set as Study I. The interview questions of interest were 
the anticipated open questions on their intentions (“Please tell me, in as much detail as 
possible, what you had intended to do in the shopping center?”) and the unanticipated 
open questions on the planning of their intentions (“Please tell me, in as much detail as 
possible, how you went about planning your trip to the shopping center?”). In Experiment 
1, participants were interviewed once. Experiment 2 (N = 123, 83 women, Mage = 27.18, 
SD = 7.81) used an identical design to Experiment 1 except that participants were 
interviewed on three separate occasions. This allowed for a measure of within-group and 
between-statement consistency. Again, the questions of interest were the anticipated open 
questions on intentions and the unanticipated open questions on the planning of their 
intentions. 
 
Results and Discussion  
For within-group consistency, the following findings were observed in both 
experiments: truth tellers provided more consistent answers for both questions on 
planning and questions on intentions; and answers to questions on planning were, across 
both veracity conditions, less consistent than answers to questions on intentions. These 
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results differ from Hypothesis 1, where differences between truth tellers and liars were 
only expected for the questions on planning. 
For statement length, there was an interaction between veracity and question type 
in both experiments. Truth tellers provided longer answers than liars for questions on both 
their intentions and planning. Furthermore, truth tellers’ answers tended to increase in 
length when describing the planning phase compared to their descriptions of their 
intentions, whereas liars’ answers tended to decrease in length when describing the 
planning phase compared to descriptions of their intentions. This result held across the 
two experiments. This result is in line with Hypothesis 3, and is in accordance with the 
idea that truth tellers who plan in groups will have a great deal to talk about. In contrast, 
liars should become more withholding in groups, for fear of producing inconsistencies, 
particularly when asked questions about the planning of their intentions (i.e., 
unanticipated questions).    
In Experiment 2, truth tellers and liars showed a similar level of between-
statement consistency for both questions on intentions and questions on planning. This 
speaks against Hypothesis 2, where it was expected that truth tellers would be more 
consistent for the question on planning. One possible explanation for this unexpected 
result is that the questions between interviews did not vary. For this reason, the questions 
were unlikely to disrupt a liar’s repeat strategy. This can account for the relatively high 
level of between-statement consistency that liars achieved on answers to unanticipated 
questions. The results regarding between statement consistency have since been replicated 
in a similar study that used a more fine-grained measure of consistency. The study, 
examining true and false intentions, measured the omissions (details mentioned in a first 
interview that were omitted from later interviews), commissions (details not mentioned in 
a first interview that were added in later interviews) and repetitions (details repeated 
between interviews) in participants’ answers across repeated interviews. The results 
showed no notable differences between truth tellers and liars on any of the measures of 
between-statement consistency (Granhag, Mac Giolla, Sooniste, Strömwall, & Liu-
Jönsson, 2016). 
 
Study III 
The focus of Study III was on task-related spontaneous thought. As noted above, 
future tasks create spontaneous thoughts. Based on this idea, it was hypothesized that 
truth tellers would experience more spontaneous thought related to their stated intention 
compared to liars, since only truth tellers’ stated intentions refer to tasks they intend to 
carry out. The study consisted of three experiments. Experiment 1 tested the basic claim 
that those with a true intention will experience more spontaneous thought related to their 
stated intention than those with a false intention. Experiment 2 extended this by 
examining whether those stating a true or false intention would differ in their descriptions 
of their spontaneous thoughts in an interview context. Finally, Experiment 3 built on 
Experiment 2 by examining a more ecologically valid true intention.   
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Experiment 1  
The main purpose of Experiment 1 was to test the claim that people with a true 
intention should experience more task-related spontaneous thoughts compared to those 
with a false intention.  
 
Method. Participants (N = 61, 34 women, Mage = 29.77, SD = 9.88) were divided 
into truth tellers (n = 30) and liars (n = 31). The sample size was based on previous 
research using similar measures of spontaneous thoughts (e.g., Masicampo & Baumeister, 
2011). Truth tellers (true intention group) received a future task to perform (to come up 
with arguments for and against the introduction of university tuition fees). Liars (false 
intention group) received the same instructions as truth tellers, but were explicitly told 
they were not to perform the task. Rather, their goal was simply to claim that they were to 
perform the task. The spontaneous thought measure was performed after the two groups 
produced video recorded statements of intent. The spontaneous thought measure was 
taken from previous research on spontaneous thoughts (Masicampo & Baumeister, 2011; 
Smallwood, McSpadden, & Schooler, 2008). The measure consisted of reading a short 
passage of text and subsequently answering how often one thought about the argument 
creation task during the reading task and how distracting one found those thoughts.   
 
Results and discussion. In brief, results showed that those with a true intention 
thought more about the future argument creation task during the reading task compared to 
those with a false intention. In other words, truth tellers had more task-related 
spontaneous thoughts related to their stated intentions than liars.  
  
Experiment 2  
Experiment 2 extended Experiment 1 by: (1) making the truth tellers’ task more 
complex; (2) increasing the interval between intention creation and intention initiation to 
one week; and (3) including an interview element about the future intention so that results 
were not solely based on self-report measures. During the interview, participants were 
asked about spontaneous thoughts related to their intentions. Based on the idea that task 
related-spontaneous thoughts are facilitative in goal attainment, it was predicted that truth 
tellers’ descriptions of spontaneous thoughts would be related to problem solving and 
preparatory work for the future task to a greater extent than liars’ descriptions. In contrast, 
liars’ descriptions were expected to consist of more repetitions of the instructions 
compared to truth tellers’ descriptions. This is because liars’ prepared answers were 
expected to be more script-like in nature.   
 
Method. Participants (N =55, 34 women, Mage = 28.05, SD = 8.17) were 
designated as truth tellers (n = 28) or liars (n = 27).2 Truth tellers were told they were to 
participate in a debate with another student in one week’s time. The debate concerned 
plagiarism at universities. In addition, truth tellers were to partake in a brief pre-debate 
                                                          
2 A total of 79 participants partook in the study. However, 24 (19 truth tellers, 5 liars) participants 
did not return for the second session. Issues of attrition are discussed further in the Appendix (Study 
III). 
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interview with the debate moderator. They were led to believe that this was a check to see 
if they were sufficiently prepared for the debate. Liars received the same instructions as 
truth tellers, but were told they were not going to participate in the debate. Rather, their 
goal was to perform the pre-debate interview, where they were to convince the moderator 
that they were in fact going to participate in the debate.   
 
Results and discussion. In line with predictions, the self-report measures 
demonstrated that truth tellers experienced more spontaneous thoughts related to the 
debate than liars. In contrast, liars experienced more spontaneous thoughts related to the 
pre-debate interview than truth tellers. This latter finding highlights the importance of the 
salience of the future task with regard to generating spontaneous thought. Problematically, 
no differences were found between truth tellers’ and liars’ descriptions of spontaneous 
thoughts in the pre-debate interview.  
 
Experiment 3  
One potential explanation for the lack of differences between truth tellers and liars 
in Experiment 2, is that the preparatory work required for the liars’ primary task (i.e., the 
pre-debate interview) and the truth tellers’ primary task (i.e., the debate) may have been 
quite similar. Hence, liars’ deceitful statements may have been embedded in largely true 
statements. That is, they could describe their genuine spontaneous thoughts about the pre-
debate interview, but simply report them as spontaneous thoughts about the debate itself. 
This could have increased the similarities between truth tellers’ and liars’ responses, since 
embedded lies are particularly difficult to uncover (Vrij, 2008). The aim of Experiment 3 
was to avoid this potential confound by having the truth tellers’ intention more distinct 
from the interview task. An additional goal of Experiment 3 was to have a more 
ecologically valid self-generated true intention. Again it was predicted that truth tellers’ 
descriptions in comparison to liars’ descriptions, would be more focused on planning 
issues and potential problems regarding their intentions.     
 
Method. A quasi-experimental setup was used, similar to that developed by 
Warmelink et al. (2012). One hundred participants (72 women, Mage = 29.58, SD = 10.74) 
took part in the study.  Fifty participants were recruited who had, independently of the 
study, planned a trip abroad in the coming months. These participants were the truth 
tellers and the trip abroad was their true intention. Another fifty participants, who had not 
planned a trip abroad in the coming months, were recruited as liars. Each liar was 
matched to a truth teller and given information about his/her trip abroad. Hence, the trip 
abroad was the liars’ false intention. In subsequent interviews, truth tellers and liars were 
asked a series of questions on spontaneous thoughts about the trip. 
 
Results and discussion. In brief, the results largely replicated the results of 
Experiment 2, but with a more ecologically valid true intention. Differences between truth 
tellers and liars were again observed on the subjective ratings in the post-interview 
questionnaire. However, these subjective differences did not result in discernable cues to 
deceit in an interview setting. Two potential explanations are proposed for the lack of 
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differences between truth tellers’ and liars’ descriptions. First, the results may once again 
highlight people’s impressive aptitude at lying (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Second, the 
results may highlight limitations in people’s ability to accurately provide retrospective 
reports of their spontaneous thoughts. Research shows that retrospective reports of 
cognitive processes are difficult and prone to error (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). These errors 
derive, in part, from people inferring their answers from commonly held beliefs and 
scripts rather than from actual memories (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Pearson, Ross, & 
Dawes, 1992). Hence, although truth tellers believed they were accurately describing their 
spontaneous thoughts, they may instead have been relying on stereotypical beliefs and 
schemas to infer their answers. People are also thought to rely on stereotypical beliefs and 
schemas when fabricating answers. Hence, the similarities between truth tellers’ and liars’ 
responses may be due to both groups relying on similar cognitive resources.  
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
A theoretical framework for true and false intentions was outlined in the 
introduction. To reiterate, stated true intentions activate goals, while stated false intentions 
do not. Goals, in turn, have predictable consequences on human behavior (see Figure 2 
below for a model over the expected consequences of a true intention/goal directed 
behavior). In so far as these consequences are beneficial for attaining the active goal, they 
should be superfluous for the empty goals of a stated false intention. Hence, the 
predictable and often automatic consequences of active goals should be weaker or 
nonexistent for those with a false intention. Of course, even if this argument holds, liars 
can still pretend to have experienced these consequences. Liars can pepper their 
statements with the expected consequences of true intentions in order to create a 
believable impression. Therefore, although there may be differences between truth tellers 
and liars on a conceptual level, these need not manifest as measurable differences on a 
practical level. Strategic interviewing methods aid in this issue by developing these 
conceptual differences into measureable cues in an interview setting. The proposed theory 
of true and false intentions, therefore, has two elements. The first is on a conceptual level 
and holds that the typical consequences of true intentions or active goals will be weaker 
for those with a false intention (see Figure 2). The second is on a more practical level and 
predicts that strategic interviewing methods can be used to enhance or elicit the 
differences expected on a conceptual level, since these may not otherwise manifest as 
measurable cues to deceit. The discussion that follows addresses the results of the three 
studies from these two perspectives.  
 
Truth Tellers as Good Planners 
In Study I it was examined whether truth tellers would engage in better planning 
behavior than liars. The measure of good planning behavior was related to indicators of 
plan efficiency, how-related vs. why-related utterings, and tendencies to consider 
potential problems. As predicted, truth tellers stated that they were more likely to delegate 
tasks to group members, that is, the measure of plan efficiency. In addition, truth tellers’ 
statements consisted of relatively more how-related utterings than liars’ statements. In 
contrast, liars’ statements consisted of relatively more why-related utterings than truth 
tellers’ statements. These differences emerged for statements of intent for anticipated 
questions which liars had explicitly prepared for. In other words, it was possible to 
uncover cues indicative of true and false intent without any strategic interviewing 
techniques, when one knew where to look.  
Of these cues, the how-related and why-related utterings are more generalizable. 
This is because the measure of plan efficiency, whether tasks were delegated to group 
members, is dependent on situations where intentions are planned in groups. This is not 
the case for how-related and why-related utterings. As evidence of this, the how-why 
finding has since been replicated in three separate studies, with groups of suspects 
(Sooniste et al., 2014) and with individual suspects (Granhag et al., 2016; Sooniste, 
Granhag, Strömwall, & Vrij, 2015).  
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Figure 2. A model of typical consequences associated with the formation of a true 
intention. The consequences are expected to be weaker, or non-existent, for those 
expressing a false intention.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Constructs inside the dashed line refer to the basic requisites of an intention. Constructs marked 
with an asterisk were the focus of the thesis. Constructs marked with a † have been examined in 
previous research. The remaining constructs are suggested areas for future research.  
 
 
In addition, a different theoretical framework converges with the original 
explanations of the how-why finding. The original explanation regarded how-related 
utterings as a proxy measure of an implementation intention, which in turn was seen as an 
indicator of good planning behavior. In contrast, predictions regarding why-related 
utterings were derived from research on counter-interrogation strategies which holds that 
liars are less likely to take their innocence for granted and hence may feel a greater need 
to justify their future actions by explaining why they are needed to be performed. An 
additional and more parsimonious explanation comes from Construal Level Theory (CLT; 
Trope & Liberman, 2010). To reiterate, CLT holds that psychological distance affects the 
representation of future events, where the more psychologically distant the event, the 
more abstractly it is represented. Hypotheticality is a particular form of psychological 
distance of relevance to true and false intentions. It refers to the perceived likelihood of a 
future event occurring, where events that are unlikely to occur are perceived more 
Planning* 
Spontaneous 
Thought* 
Episodic Future 
Thought† 
CLT (Future 
Representations) 
Attention / 
Memory 
Evaluative 
Judgments† 
Active goal / 
True Intention 
Goal 
Reasoning 
Comittment 
Action / Desired 
End State 
 31 
 
abstractly than events that are highly likely to occur (Wakslak, Trope, Liberman, & 
Alony, 2006). Since false intentions, by definition, come with a low likelihood of being 
carried out (in fact the probability should be zero), while true intentions come with a high 
likelihood, it follows that false intentions should be represented more abstractly than true 
intentions.  
Furthermore, research on CLT has demonstrated that actions construed in more 
abstract terms are linked to issues concerning why the action is to be performed, 
emphasizing the superordinate purposes of the action. In contrast, actions construed in 
concrete terms are linked with how the action is to be performed, emphasizing concrete 
procedural steps (Rim et al., 2014; Stephan, Liberman, & Trope, 2010; Wakslak & Trope, 
2009). Hence, due to liars’ low likelihood of performing their stated intentions, CLT also 
predicts that they will focus more on why the intention is to be carried out. In contrast, 
since truth tellers have a high likelihood of performing their stated intentions, CLT 
predicts that truth tellers will focus more on how the intention is to be carried out. This is 
in agreement with the observed results.  
The CLT perspective can also be incorporated within the proposed framework of 
true and false intentions. For example, the reason events with a high likelihood of 
occurring are more likely to be considered in concrete terms, is that attending to concrete 
procedural steps will aid in goal attainment. However, attending to concrete procedural 
steps is likely to be considered an ineffective use of resources if there is a low likelihood 
of the event occurring, as is the case with a false intention. Hence, liars may be more 
likely to think of the future event in more abstract terms. This idea would also be in line 
with those who propose that liars avail of scripts of limited scope to fabricate their 
statements (DePaulo et al., 2003). 
The cues discussed so far were derived from statements to anticipated questions. 
However, the proposed theory is also inspired by recent developments in strategic 
interviewing (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). In Study I questions were asked so as to elicit 
markers of good planning behavior.  One marker of good planning behavior is the 
tendency to anticipate problems with one’s plans (Mumford et al., 2001), that is, problems 
in carrying out one’s intentions. To this end, participants were asked “Did you expect any 
problems to arise during your trip to the shopping center?” Truth tellers (73%) were 
considerably more likely to say ‘yes’ than liars (37%). This finding shows the value in 
combining the basic research on intentions with strategic interviewing methods. Or rather, 
how basic research on intentions can uncover themes for unanticipated interview 
questions. This result also highlights how straightforward strategic interviewing can be. 
The question asked required only a yes/no answer and could readily be included in an 
interview protocol. With that said, it is seldom so easy. While the question on potential 
problems produced differences, the question on back-up plans did not. Nonetheless, as a 
first study focusing on how markers of good planning behavior can be elicited to 
distinguish between those with a true and false intention, the results are promising.     
 
Intention-Related Spontaneous Thoughts 
In Study III it was predicted that truth tellers would experience more spontaneous 
thoughts related to their stated intentions than liars. This was predicted because intention-
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related spontaneous thoughts have a functional value that is expected to be lost on liars. 
The results based on self-report measures support the prediction, and provide support for 
the proposed theoretical framework at a conceptual level. However, the subjective 
differences between truth tellers and liars did not result in discernable cues to deceit 
during interviews. Hence, the second more applied aspect of the proposed framework did 
not receive support. That is, strategic interviewing methods were unable to turn the 
differences on a conceptual level into discernable differences at an applied level. The 
critical question is why this was the case? 
A number of potential explanations are suggested. First, although truth tellers 
reported experiencing more spontaneous thoughts related to their intentions than liars, 
liars nonetheless reported experiencing some spontaneous thoughts related to their stated 
intentions. Hence, the differences between truth tellers and liars may have been one of 
degree rather than quality. This could explain the differences on the Likert-scale self-
report measure and the lack of differences in the descriptions of spontaneous thoughts 
reported during the interviews. Qualifying this explanation is the finding that truth tellers 
and liars managed to list an equal number of intention-related spontaneous thoughts 
(Study III, Experiment 3).  
A second explanation is that the results once again highlight people’s proficiency 
at lying. That is, even when asked an unanticipated question, such as to describe their 
spontaneous thoughts about a future task, liars are more than capable of providing 
answers that are for all intents and purposes indistinguishable from truth tellers’ answers. 
Considering the meta-analyses highlighting the similarities between truth tellers and liars 
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Bond & DePaulo, 2008; DePaulo et al., 2003), such an 
explanation may have some merit. However, it is difficult to reconcile this explanation 
with the recent developments in strategic interviewing, demonstrating, amongst other 
things, the potential effectiveness of asking unanticipated questions (Vrij, 2015a).  
A third explanation is that the results highlight limitations in truth tellers’ abilities 
to accurately provide retrospective reports of their spontaneous thoughts. Research warns 
against the accuracy of retrospective reports of cognitive processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 
1977). One cause of the reduced accuracy in recall is that many cognitive processes are 
not sufficiently attended to when they originally occur (Ericsson & Simon, 1980). This 
attention is necessary for a memory of the cognitive process to be encoded in long term 
memory. Without an accurate encoding in long term memory, it is unlikely that an 
accurate report can be provided retrospectively. In such situations, rather than reporting 
accurate memories of their cognitive processes, people are thought to infer their memories 
from other sources such as stereotypic beliefs, schemas, or their current states, resulting in 
memory errors (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Pearson et al., 1992). Applied to the results 
from Study III, truth tellers’ reports of their spontaneous thoughts may have been an 
example of this form of memory error. That is, if their original spontaneous thoughts were 
not sufficiently attended to when they occurred, they would not be available later for 
accurate recall. Importantly, these memory errors can occur without people’s awareness 
(Pearson et al., 1992). Hence, although truth tellers may have believed they were recalling 
their memories of their spontaneous thoughts, they may in fact have been relying on 
stereotypic beliefs and schemas to infer their answers. It is plausible that liars also rely on 
such stereotypic beliefs and schemas when fabricating their answers (Colwell et al., 2007; 
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Köhnken, 1989; Volbert & Banse, 2014). This raises the possibility that the similarities 
observed between truth tellers’ and liars’ answers regarding spontaneous thoughts were 
due to both groups relying on similar cognitive resources. That is, both groups were 
relying on the same stereotypical beliefs and schemas to provide their answers.  
The third explanation can also account for other findings on research on true and 
false intentions. For example, Knieps and colleagues (Knieps et al., 2013a, 2013b; 
Knieps, Granhag, & Vrij, 2014) consistently found that truth tellers reported experiencing 
more episodic future thoughts (EFTs) about their stated intentions compared to liars. 
However, very few differences were found between truth tellers’ and liars’ descriptions of 
their EFTs. Again, this may have been because truth tellers were inferring their answers 
from stereotypic beliefs or schemas, the very same beliefs and schemas that liars are 
likely to have used to fabricate their responses. Generally speaking, the third explanation 
raises important concerns about unanticipated interview techniques that rely on truth 
tellers being able to precisely and accurately recall memories of thoughts or cognitive 
processes.  
 
Unanticipated Questions 
This thesis also sought to advance strategic interviewing techniques, specifically, 
the unanticipated questions approach, in conjunction with research on true and false 
intentions. To this end, as well as providing novel cues to deceit, the proposed theoretical 
framework of true and false intentions is also meant to provide themes for the 
development of unanticipated questions. In Study II the theme concerned the planning 
phase of the participants’ stated intentions. Although the theme of planning was 
developed with true and false intentions in mind, the cues that the unanticipated questions 
were directed towards were more traditional.  Specifically, they focused on eliciting 
greater differences between truth tellers and liars for statement length, within-group 
consistency, and between-statement consistency. The following discussion can therefore 
apply to the unanticipated questions approach more generally, and is not limited to intent 
situations.  
Statement length, within-group consistency, and between-statement consistency 
often show little differences between truth tellers and liars when they answer anticipated 
questions (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Strömwall, Granhag, & Jonsson, 2003). In 
contrast, when answering unanticipated questions, on the planning that went into their 
intentions, greater differences are expected between truth tellers and liars (Sooniste et al., 
2013; Sooniste et al., 2014). Based on these findings Study II had three hypotheses:  (H1) 
truth tellers would have higher within-group consistency than liars, but only for the 
unanticipated questions (the questions on planning); (H2) truth tellers would have higher 
between-statement consistency than liars, but only for the unanticipated questions; and 
(H3) truth tellers would provide longer answers to both the anticipated and unanticipated 
questions; however, the differences were expected to be larger for the answers to the 
unanticipated questions. The results only supported the hypothesis for statement length, 
where differences in length between truth tellers’ and liars’ statements increased for the 
unanticipated questions. For within-group consistency, truth tellers provided more 
consistent answers for both anticipated and unanticipated questions. In contrast, no 
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differences in consistency were found between truth tellers and liars for between-
statement consistency for either the anticipated or unanticipated questions.  
Although these results differ from the predictions, when taken together and when 
examined in the light of past research, they can provide important insights into the 
unanticipated questions approach. The basic idea, as noted above, is to ask questions so 
that truth tellers can rely on their memory when answering, while liars must fabricate 
answers on the spot (Vrij, 2014). The present results imply that this basic account is 
limited for consistency cues. In addition, the results imply that attempts to elicit some 
cues may hinder the elicitation of other cues. For example, in Study II, open-ended 
unanticipated questions were necessary to elicit differences in statement length. However, 
open-ended questions (which allow for variation in statement length and detail) are likely 
to reduce within-group consistency even for truth tellers, thereby limiting its value as a 
cue to deceit. Such an idea implies that questions should be tailored to the cue of interest.  
Based on the results from Study II, and the results from past research, I suggest 
templates for framing unanticipated questions in suspect interviews for the three different 
cues studied: statement length, within-group consistency, and between-statement 
consistency. An important first step is to decide whether the suspect’s answers are to be 
specific (i.e, shorter) or open-ended (i.e., longer). By adding this dimension to the 
anticipated-unanticipated dimension a basic matrix can be created (Figure 3).    
 
 
Figure 3. Basic framing matrix for questions in a suspect interview 
 
 Anticipated 
 
Unanticipated 
Specific 
(A) (B) 
? Short statements; veracity has 
no effect on statement length 
? Within-group consistency is 
high for both truth tellers and 
liars 
 
? Short statements; veracity has 
no effect on statement length 
? Within-group consistency is 
high for truth tellers, but low 
for liars 
Open 
 
(C) 
 
(D) 
? Long statements; truth tellers 
provide somewhat longer 
statements than liars 
? Within-group consistency is 
low for both groups 
? Long statements; truth tellers 
provide considerably longer 
statements than liars 
? Within-group consistency is 
low for both groups 
 
 
For the cue statement length, a necessary requirement is that the answers can vary 
in length. Hence, general open questions are appropriate, quadrants C and D. It was 
questions of this form that were examined in Study II (i.e., open questions on intent and 
planning). This may explain why the unanticipated questions were most effective for the 
cue statement length.   
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For within-group consistency, however, it is more important to ask specific 
questions, quadrants A and B. This is because open-ended answers decrease the overlap 
between truth tellers’ statements. This is evident by the low levels of within-group 
consistency of truth tellers even for the anticipated questions in Study II. For instance, in 
Study II (Experiment 1) truth tellers had a mean score of 2.95 on a 7-point scale, where a 
higher score indicates a higher degree of overlap. Answers were even less consistent for 
the unanticipated questions, with a mean score of just 2.10. The consistency levels were 
lower again for the liars. Hence, the issue was not with lowering liars’ consistency, but 
with increasing truth tellers’ consistency. I maintain that this can be better achieved with 
specific questions. Consider the results of an earlier study by Vrij et al. (2009). In that 
study, pairs of truth tellers had eaten lunch together, while pairs of liars only pretended to 
have done so. For anticipated questions, no differences between truth tellers’ and liars’ 
levels of within-group consistency were found. For unanticipated questions, however, 
large differences were found. Importantly, the unanticipated questions were highly 
specific (e.g., “Who finished their lunch first?”), increasing the likelihood of truth tellers’ 
answers overlapping, and in turn keeping the within-group consistency levels high. If 
framed correctly, specific unanticipated questions may also be particularly difficult for 
liars to answer, since they cannot rely on the ambiguities allowed with everyday speech 
(Vrij et al., 2009). For example, when describing the size of an object, a liar could be 
asked to use specific measurements (e.g., meters and centimeters) rather than qualifiers 
and adjectives (e.g., “quite large”). The ambiguity associated with an answer such as 
“quite large” may conceal inconsistencies between the statements of two liars. 
A final caveat when examining within-group consistency was raised in a study by 
Roos af Hjelmsäter, Öhman, Granhag, and Vrij (2014). Here, unanticipated questions 
distinguished truth tellers from liars, but only if the unanticipated questions concerned 
important or salient features of the event that truth tellers completed. Salience of the topic 
is therefore another requisite. This is because truth tellers’ memories of non-salient details 
may be weaker, which in turn may decrease the overlap of statements (a parallel can be 
made to the discussion above about the difficulties in providing retrospective reports of 
cognitive processes).  In sum, unanticipated questions targeted at within-group 
consistency should be specific, requiring short or closed answers, and refer to salient 
topics.  
Between-statement consistency, the cue available from repeated interviews, poses 
additional issues. Based on the results from Study II (Experiment 2) the problem is less 
with increasing the consistency of truth tellers’ statements, but more with decreasing the 
consistency of liars’ statements. In such situations, salient, specific, unanticipated 
questions may still be insufficient. Even when such questions are posed, liars can simply 
repeat the answers they gave in prior interviews. A crucial aspect for this cue is, therefore, 
that the question varies across interviews in some manner. This was not the case in Study 
II, which may explain the comparable levels of between-statement consistency shown by 
truth tellers and liars. This can be contrasted with a study by Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, and 
Mann (2011; see also Leins et al., 2012). In their study, they varied the recall mode 
between interviews (e.g., verbal description [anticipated] in interview one and pictorial 
drawing [unanticipated] in interview two). Hence, the unanticipated aspect of the question 
referred to the response format, rather than question content. By using an unanticipated 
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response format the anticipated question and the unanticipated question referred to the 
same theme (i.e., the layout of a room), allowing for a direct comparison between the two 
answers. Results from two experiments showed a classification accuracy of 70-100% 
when veracity judgments were based on between-statement consistency (i.e., comparing 
the overlap between a suspect’s verbal description and sketch drawing). Whether such an 
approach is necessary for a more general interview template (i.e., that the anticipated and 
unanticipated questions must refer to the same theme) is debatable. However, based on 
the results from Study II, simply repeating an unanticipated question across interviews is 
unlikely to be sufficient in eliciting lower levels of between-statement consistency from 
liars.     
 
Limitations 
A recurring theme, particularly for Study I and Study II, is the relationship 
between planning and intent. As noted, although intentions are often accompanied by in-
depth planning, this must not be the case (Malle & Knobe, 2001). In Study I and Study II 
truth tellers were explicitly encouraged to plan their future actions in detail. Without such 
instructions it could be argued that the observed differences in truth tellers’ and liars’ 
planning behavior would not have occurred. In response to this I would claim, first, that 
detailed planning, as reiterated throughout, is often associated with an intention, and 
second, that it was precisely such situations that were of interest. That is, it was planned 
future actions that were the focus of the studies. The instructions were to ensure that it 
was such situations that were examined. It is for future research to examine situations 
where the need to plan the intention has been reduced or situations when intentions are 
not typically accompanied by in-depth plans. This would include future tasks based on 
habits or scripts (for a discussion on other relevant contexts see Mac Giolla et al., 2015). 
In such contexts it less likely that differences between truth tellers and liars would emerge 
for planning behavior or on the level of intention-related spontaneous thoughts. In other 
words, the typical consequences of intention formation may be weaker for intentions 
based on habits or script like behaviors. Such situations are represented in Figure 2 by the 
arrow that directly connects an intention to an action, which bypasses the typical 
consequences of intention formation. 
My response to potential criticisms of the use of a restricted definition of intent—
planned single acts to be performed in the near future—is similar. Many forms of intent 
relevant to legal settings are excluded by this definition. However, it should only be seen 
as a starting point (Granhag, 2010). The breadth and scope of the term intent necessitates 
a certain degree of delineation. Future research should take hold of the various other 
forms of intent and differing contexts omitted by such restrictions (for a discussion see 
Mac Giolla et al., 2015). This can include more abstract intentions or intentions in the 
more distant future. Such intentions could for instance be relevant for judges at parole 
hearings assessing prisoners’ statements concerning their intentions to live lawfully. 
Recent research has also examined statements of past intentions (Zangrossi, Agosta, 
Cervesato, Tessarotto, & Sartori, 2015). This research addresses the pressing question of 
how to determine the intentionality of a past action, a relevant issue in many court cases. 
Future research on true and false intentions could also examine the effect of holding 
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multiple or even conflicting intentions or goals—a common occurrence in everyday life 
(Fishbach & Ferguson, 2007).   
The use of student samples, particularly in the role of mock criminals, raises 
additional concerns. To increase ecological validity, the instructions given to liars were 
derived from empirical research on suspects’ counter-interrogation strategies (Clemens, 
Granhag, & Strömwall, 2013) and real-life resistance manuals (e.g., The Manchester 
Manual). Both sources emphasize the use of prepared cover-stories, which was mirrored 
in the design of the studies. With that said, the motivation of real criminals is difficult to 
reproduce in the lab. Real criminals, for instance, may be more motivated to produce in-
depth cover-stories, which could affect the observed results. However, this may only 
provide them with better answers (e.g., more consistent or longer) to anticipated 
questions. Furthermore, a recent meta-analysis indicates that low motivation and the use 
of student samples may have less of an influence on lying behavior than once thought 
(Hartwig & Bond, 2014). Results showed that the detectability of lies was not influenced 
by participants’ motivation to be believed or whether or not they were university students. 
From a perspective of experimental design an important limitation of Study I and 
Study II is that truth tellers were asked to plan one activity (to prepare a Swedish lunch) 
while liars were asked to plan two (a mock-crime and a cover-story). This design was 
chosen to mirror real life situations where it is plausible that liars will have such a dual 
task, but truth tellers will not. Nonetheless, the asymmetry between tasks may be a 
contributing factor to the observed results. For example, liars’ ability to answer questions 
during the interview may have been hampered because they had an additional task to plan 
for rather than because they were answering questions on a false intention. Mitigating this 
issue is the finding that participants were generally satisfied with the time they had to plan 
their tasks. Furthermore, the instructions for the liars’ mock-crime were very exact, 
limiting the need for extensive planning. This was not an issue for Study III since truth 
tellers and liars planned an equal number of future tasks. 
 
Future Directions and Opportunities 
Individual differences are relatively understudied in deception detection research 
(Vrij, 2008). This is partly justified, as individual differences in lie detection ability are 
negligible (Bond & DePaulo, 2008). With that said, non-trivial differences exist regarding 
credibility—some people are simply more believable regardless if they are telling the 
truth or not (Bond & DePaulo, 2008).  From the perspective of true and false intentions 
certain individual differences could have particular influence on people’s statements. For 
example, people differ in their ability to pursue goals (Latham, Ganegoda, & Locke, 
2011). This includes tendencies to set, commit to, and plan for goals. Those with a true 
intention who are poor at goal-pursuit may show fewer or weaker markers of active goals, 
and hence may provide answers more similar to an average liar. By attending to such 
individual differences deception detection methods may be more sensitive on a case by 
case basis.  
Regarding strategic interviewing approaches more generally, scholars have 
warned that, despite some promising results,  few of the extant studies address the 
underlying cognitive mechanisms of the interview methods examined (Blandón-Gitlin, 
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Fenn, Masip, & Yoo, 2014; Walczyk, Igou, Dixon, & Tcholakian, 2013). They highlight, 
for instance, how basic research on memory, neuroimaging, and information management 
can give a more solid foundation to interviewing strategies such as the unanticipated 
questions approach. The current studies did not address these underlying cognitive 
mechanisms. However, by rooting the proposed theoretical framework in basic research 
on intentions and related fields such as goals, planning and spontaneous thoughts, much 
research already exists that can help uncover the specific cognitive mechanisms at play. 
For a greater understanding of the potential advantages and limitations of the cognitive 
approach to deception it is vital that future research takes hold of this issue. 
A final area worthy of note for future research is the issue of distinguishing 
between genuine and false threats. Although a great deal of research exists on threat 
assessment (Meloy & Hoffmann, 2013), this has primarily focused on the behavior and 
risk factors associated with the person who threatens. Instead, applying the research of 
true and false intentions to a threat situation would change the focus to the stated threat 
itself, where the aim is to determine if the threat is genuine or a bluff. The value of being 
able to distinguish between a true threat and bluff cannot be overstated. It has obvious 
bearing in security operations, but also in areas less directly associated with the legal 
setting. For example, in the UK, hoax calls cost emergency services millions of pounds 
each year (Nugent & Sidders, 2008). The first experimental studies on distinguishing 
between true and false threats have already begun (Geurts, Granhag, Ask, & Vrij, in 
press). More will be needed in order to reap the practical benefits this research has the 
potential to provide.  
  
Ethical Considerations 
The ethics of the current studies can be considered on at least two levels. The first 
is the level of the experiment, particularly the welfare of the participants involved in the 
study. The second is at the societal level; what implications the research can have on 
society at large. These issues can be independent of each other. That is, some research can 
raise concerns at the participant level, but be ethically sound at the societal level. In 
contrast, some research can be ethically sound at the participant level, but have 
questionable agendas at the societal level.  
At the level of the experiment, half of the participants believed they were to 
perform a mock-crime and were required to lie in interviews. To combat these issues 
participants were told that all individuals they would meet throughout the study (e.g., shop 
personnel) were aware that it was a mock-crime. In addition, no participant actually 
performed the mock-crime; they were all interrupted before they could carry out their 
intentions. With regards to the act of lying, some participants may have been hesitant to 
engage in something that many consider morally wrong. To resolve this issue, participants 
were reassured that they could leave the studies at any time and still receive their 
compensation.  
The thesis also raises concerns at the broader societal level. As alluded to in the 
introduction, these concerns surround the issue of penalizing an action that has yet to be 
performed. This thorny issue has received attention from legal scholars, who for example, 
highlight the tension between the more traditional ethos of criminal investigations 
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concerning crimes that have already occurred with the more preventative nature of 
counter-terrorism or security work (McCulloch & Pickering, 2009). The tension arises 
because the focus on crime-prevention is at odds with the principles of due process and 
the presumption of innocence, which build on the assumption that a crime has been 
committed (McCulloch & Pickering, 2009). One potential way to mitigate this issue is to 
see the applied value of research on true and false intentions at the early stage of an 
investigative process. That is, lie-detection techniques on true and false intentions may be 
more appropriate in an initial screening phase, which can help guide investigators 
attention and allocation of resources, rather than as a tool for providing evidence in court 
proceedings. A second argument, already raised in the introduction, is one of pragmatics. 
That is, regardless of whether research on true and false intentions is carried out, 
professionals must continue to make veracity judgements about people’s stated intentions. 
Without scientific research on the topic it cannot be known whether the methods 
professionals use to make such veracity judgements are valid or not.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
Since Granhag’s (2010) call to focus on true and false intentions the literature on 
the topic has grown steadily. It now includes over 20 experimental studies and at least five 
PhD theses (Clemens, 2013; Knieps, 2013; Sooniste, 2015; Wallace, 2013; Warmelink, 
2012). The primary aim of the current thesis was to put forward a theoretical framework 
that can parsimoniously capture this research while at the same time generate new 
hypotheses for intention-specific lie detection techniques. This framework is rooted in a 
cognitive approach to lie detection, with a focus on verbal cues, that avails of the recent 
developments in strategic interviewing. With that said, with a specific focus on intentions 
and goals, the proposed theoretical framework can be distinguished from previous work, 
and thereby make a unique contribution to deception theory. 
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